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SUMMARY
¢ _. Volume ill is a detailed description and explanation of the
operational availability parameter. The fundamental mathematical
basis for operational availability is developed, and its relation-
ship to a system's overall performance effectiveness is illustrated_J
within the context of identifying specific availability require-
ments. Thus, in attempting to provide a general methodology for
i! I treating both hypothetical and existing availability requirements,
the concept of an "availability state", in conjunction with the
more conventional probability-time capability, is investigated.
In his respect, emphasis is focused upon a balanced analytical
and pragramatic trea:ment of operational availability within the
system design process. For example, several applications of
operational availability to typical aerospace systems are presented,
encompassing the techniques of Monte Carlo Simulation, System
Performance Availability Trade-Off Studies, Analytical Modeling of
specific scenarios, as well as the determination of launch-on-Time
probabilities. Finally, an extensive bibliography is provided to
indicate further levels of depth and detail of the operational f
availability parameter.
(
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t1. INTRODUCTION
Operational availability is a measure of the extent to which a
system can be expected to be in a state or condition to perform
its assigned function within an established time frame and
_: j.
under given environmental conditions. As such, a system's
operational availability Includes both a detailed description of
• the performance characteristics of individual system elements, as
"" well as the specification of the overall system states. In this
_espect, the resultant complexity of large aerospace systems
' _ i_,volves a broad set of requirements that express the multitude of
_ mlsslon objectives. This complexity brings with it the need for
a quantitative means to measure the total effectiveness of a system,
i particularly where alternative approaches are to be considered.One fundamental approach to the measurement of total systems
r effectiveness (SE) is to formulate its effectiveness in terms
¥
of a figure of merit, such as"
• 2;sE = P (A) • P (c),J
_ P (A) = probability that the system will be operational during
i a specified time interval, or at a particular instant of time; ,
P (C) = probability of achieving the mission objectives, given '
the system is available and dependable.
The development of analytic models for total SE evaluation is
treated in detail in Appendix A. Th¢ basic charscteristics of an
effectiveness model, along with the equations for specifying
significant effectiveness functions are also given. The real
value of the resultant SE index lles in the deflnition/de_ign of
systems where choices between altern_tives are made, and the
,. primary objective Is to select that particular candidate having
the greatest overall benefit. In such cases, indices of
effectiveness aid the decision maker in terms of augmenting his
" experience and skill with a quantifiable measure of overall
• systems performance.
e'
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JA. APPROACH AND DEFINITION
in this study, the specification and definition of o_?erational
* availability is approached from two distinct points of view:
I) The contribution of operational availability to the deter-
mination of a total SE index or figure of merit within the
overall _ystems co_Itext; !
4 2) The quantification of the availability parameter in terms _
of specific performance characteristics, such as instant-
aneous availability, interval availability, steady-state
availability, or a time-dependent probability. !
i "' Thus, in the real world, the availability parameter addressesthe time usage of a system and deals with problems of failure ofsystem elements (people, equipment, facilities, etc), as wellas with the areas of support requirements needed to correct andprevent failures. As such, the measure of availability is at "determination of the degree to which a system can be expected
to perform _ome particular function. It is a probabilistic-ti_,e
capability of the system. The origin of these requirements lie
} in the prior mission analyses that are usually performed to r
quantify the overall objectives and that will ultimately drive
i the definition of a particular availability index. In the early
, _ concept phase, some of these factors are:
! I) _hat is needed to _atisfy the objectives?"" 2) What is achievable with the resources available?
3) What are the acceptable risks of success and failure?
• The mission analyses in the concept phase examine these factors
_' in detail for the major performance objectives and formulate
_"_i_i• specifications (initial) that will subsequently be used to select
...." the "design to" availabillty parameters for the concept that best
.... meets these total mission requirements, The degree of sophistication °
,_" and complexity of such analyses can vary from very complex simulations
._._, of the mission scenarios to a cursory examination of only the
......_ principal factors. Much depends on the criticality of _he particular
_ = problem being considered.
,_ The scope of such studies depends on how much is known about the
: mission and types of systems that can accomplish it. It is obvious,
• f'" for example, that a contemplated mission never befure attempted,
"":_ requiring systems never before produced, will be much more uncertain r
. (in terms of a probability measure) than a modification to an
I2
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existing system for a _revlously performed mission. The _ormer
case is of greater slgnlflcance_ because i. poses the proLlem of
establishing availability requirements for new and untried systems.
In attempting to provide a general methodology for treating
_. both hypothetical and existing availability requirements, the con-
cept of an "availability state" is introduced. This formulation
o. of availability is entirely consistent with the probabillty-tlme
"_ capability previously discussed and further includes the dimension
,_ of states The definition previously given for operational
availability, i.e , a measure of the extent a system can be
expected to be in a state or condition to perform its assigned
function, is general; how6ver, it does imply _hat a probability,
a state, and a time capabillty make up the quantification of this
'.'_ parameter. Availability requirements can, therefore be expressed
in several ways--determlned by the system and the specific manner
in which it _s used. The availability requlrement may be expressed
as:
i) A specific schedule time;
,_ 2) A time period or interval;
• 3) A random time within a time period" ,_
#-
4) A set of time frames, i.e., states;
q
• 5) An instantaneous time;
6) A steady-state condition;
. 7) A probabillty-tlme-stare use;
' _ 8) Combinations of the above.
c
• B. ANAL_IIC DEVELOz_ENT OF AVAILABILITY PARAMETERS
? A complex systems usage may include one or more of these require-
ments distributed among several elements of the systew and applying
• . to various usage states (launch, payload delivery, orbit operation,
• recovery, etc). The probabilities assoclated with each state require-
" ment represent the degree of assurance or probability of success
desired. Thus, operational availability may be expressed as a
probability o_ time requirement for any system state. The relation-
" ships are illustrated in Fig. 1, and bring together the concepts i
of pro_abllity-time-scate to quantify the availability parameteks.
3
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--T v
State X State Y
\ Fig. I Availability States "_ i
'. , In Fig. I, A is the availability requirement, subscripts i, 2,
: _ 3...indicate system elements, and superscripts a, b, c...indicate
_ ,_pecifie availability requirements for the system elements. Thus,
. I _he total operational availability for all states and all system
elements may be written symbolically from Fig. I as:
{ 1:i AS = F A1, A2, A3, AI, A2, A3; t (A) ,
where t denotes the time dependene> for each particular state.
! 'One may, for the purpose of this illustrative example, considerX as the launch state, and Y as the orbit mission state. The
elements of X are the launch vehicle, support equipment, launch
site facilities, etc, while the elements of Y are the payload,
experiment package, telemetry, data llnk, etc. Then, some typical /_
• I availability specifications for these elements would be:
' ! i) Launch on time probability (launch state);
T
2) Probability of payload availability (orbit state). _
' ? Foc each system clement, its operational availability would be
_ expressed symbolically as.
_' _.' For each system sgate, the operational availability is:
ALaunch _ A " A 2 " A 3
•:[- State S_tem state level operational
W'_Ad c f av_ilabilltyAOrbit =_-_ I " A2 " A3
State
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The total system availability is given by:
• Asystem =_ALaunch " AOrbi t
State S tate
,, "• where the availability of thc orbit state is conditional on the
: launch state availabilities•
\
, -- These symbolic equations illustrate the technique of dealing both
with the system element and system state level of availabilities•
•:." _ C. DETAIL BREAKDOWN OF AVAILABILITY
"- 4.
, i For each specific element and subelement, the measure of operational
; availability may be broken down still further as follows:
_;! I) Instantaneous availability - The probability that thc element
will be available at any random time t;
2) Interval availability - The proportion of time in an interval
that the element is available for use;
¢,
3) Steady-state availability - The proportion of time that the s[
element is available for use when the time interval considered
I s very large.
. "_ In the limit, these three measures of availability approach the
steady-state availability. Which measure is most applicable
': depends on the element state and its conditions of use For
, _ elements or subelements that are to be operated in continuou_
; systems, e.g., a detection radar system_ steady-state availability
may be the satisfactory measure. For elements whose usage is
defined by a duty cycle, e.g., a tracking radar system that is
• . - called on only after an object has been detected and is expected
._._._, .'._ to track continuously during a given time period, interval
, evailability may be the most satisfactory measure. Finally,
: for elements that are required to perform a function at any random
_:_' • time, e.g., a data processing system as part of a telemetry system
_Y"_""-._ • that is to be employed to process orbital data and then remain
•..,_.,'",,..; idle for a length of time, instantaneous availability may be the
"_" '_ .. most satisfactory measure. In general, the duty cycle of each
•_ ,,.- . element would determine the form o£ availability most appropriate
.'b_',i, as the measure of performance.
5
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'Iht expression for instantaneous availability cau be determined
• by describing tile failure and repair process in a system of linear
differential and/or difference equations as with reliability,
? with the exception that one allows foL repairs out of the failed
_, state of the system. These equations would describe the transition .._
from onu operability state to anoth_,r. The solution of the
diflcrential equations is the probability that the system is
_ available at any random time t. -.
I. Instantaneous Availab lity
For a single equipment (singl_' _:lement), the measure of
: ._ instantaneous availability, is given by:
++I %
= equipment repair rate;
I
= ectuipment failure ra_e; I
t _ a random time.
i
• This rest,it and the two- and three-equipmettt parallel and standby
redundant system instantaneous availability equations are sho_m in
' Table I. Both parallel and standby redundancy and single and
multiple repair capability formulas are given for comparative
•, • purposes.
' _ 2. Interval Ava$1ab_lSty
The proportion of time that the element Is available in an interval+
• t. to t_ can be computed by taking the average value of instantaneous
r " avlailab_lity over the tl_ of usage.
i "..._. Am (t) " 1/(t 2 t 1) t2 A(t)dt, .
6 ', ': where
', ,_i
'+ t 1 - start of mis.qion tim (usually tI " 0 );
+
'i t 2 -end of mission time.
$
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" 3 Steady-S tare Availability
: The proportion of time that the element is available in an interval
(0, t) as t becomes very large can be arrived at by taklnK the ]_mit
as t-,-oo ot the above equotlon.
A (_) = lira i t
ss t--,_ t _ A{t)dt . ""
Note that integrating the right-hand terms of the instantane_,us
' _ _vailability equations of Table I over the interval (0, o_)
' _'_ results in a solution leaving the first term on the right sick, of
$ these equltions. Thus, for example, the limiting expression f_,r a
single element (single equipment) system is:
_. A (_) = _I (_ + _).
. SS
For most elements, the measure of steady-state availability is
s_tisfaetory. Note also that because the steady-state value is
always less than the values of instantaneous and interval :_
i availability, the use of the former measure allows f,_r conservatitul.
i If one assume_ that repairs cannot be made until complete element sfailure, the expression for a single element steady-state availability
• ! can be approximated by: i
A = MTTF j
ss MTTF + MRT '
where
I_T = mean repair time = lift ;
_TF is given by I/_ .
This rather famillar expresglon may be fur;.her expanded to
illustrate in greater detall the pragm_.tlc subelement consld_ra-
tions. For example, the above formula may be reduced to: °
A . Total Uv-Time for _ Perlo_
ss Total Up-Time 4- Total DcsmCime C_r this Period
e
Mean Un-Tima for a Period . "
" H_an Up-Time Downtime for this per_.od
The above can Oe wrltCen:
A - lq_ = l_Blq .. ,
ss _q + _ !_ +
$
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where
MTBM-" mean time between maintenance actir s involving
both corrective and preventive mai..cenance;
MI)T = mean downtime;
• q
(Met + M_t) = mean of the time for the aggregate of
cor'ecti ,e and preventive maintenance
' .. dct ions ;
/ Hct= corrective maintenance downtime caused by failures
' and other causes such as accidents, human-induced
maintenance, etc ;
' Hpt = preventive maintenance that is scheduled (usually
includes daily, weekly, and monthly actions),
which may include replacement of scheduled _earout
parts, recycling, etc., depending on customer
proJtct rules.
• Note: Operational administrat" "e delay cf maintenance is not m
consideled. _r
The above expression can be reduced to:
S A = Y_'&F ,
ss _BF + l_kt
where
, Hpt does not cause system downtime. This is the cas_ ,
when Hpt is eliminated cr its need is restricted
by desilln to off-duty periods such ao during _t ot t
excuatd periods such as recycling or depot overhaul.
"' Hct considered is limitad to _ainter, ance corr_i.., of
i r_dom hardware failures and does not include
accldent_, human induced failures etc. "
o| •
_._ = (HCtlnherent +Del'aYSupply +Dc._'?w._intenanc e Administrative ) '@
I ° w_ra
i
1i
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|MCtlnherent = the mea of the controlled degree of
ma" tainability designed into hardware. It is the
responsibility of maintenance to define _by
participation in system analysis and traNe studies),
specify, predict, review, assist designers, ,.
determine design corrections, and evaluate results
in hardware for maintenance time and design character- i•
_ istics that will enable economical maintenance on time
to achieve A assuming that the facilities, environ- ""ss
ment, manpower, skills, _.ocedures, tools, test equip- •
ment, spares, and supplies, obligated by the maintenance
concept are used.
DelaYsupply = the mean of the lost time while a _,
maintenance task is suspended awaiting spares or i
supplies. It starts on official supply demand by
mai_._enance at the designated supply point. Such
delay is a function of stock identification, planned
stock layout, purchase and delivery, and reLeipt/
storage/issue by launch sites. It i_ aggravated
when sites do not follow the planned system.
DelaYMaint Admin = mean of the lost time while a mainten-
ance task is delayed awaiting the arriva] of skills, tools,
test equipment, and time out for personnel and official
re_sons. This can be aggravated when launch sites do
not follow the plans identified for facilities, mainten-
ance, environment, manpower, skills, procedures, tools,
and test equipment.
D. AVAILABILITY SPECIFICATION
l
The detailed illustrative samples presented in the _'ecedlng
sections furnish a general framework within which the specifi-
cation of availability parameters may be carried out. In
particular, these methods include modeling of the mission to
provide the means for examining the given scenarios and con-
tingeneies for each mission state and apportioning the system
availability parameters to the major elements and subelements. _ '
• The techniques and procedures in this initial phase of activity • |
" are systems analy_es, in wh .h modeling and simu_atlons based on " I
estimates, similarities to previous systems, etc are developed. _ %
The deflnition/design phase proceeds with specific requirements
for operational availability allocated to these major modules.
The task faced in the definition/design phase is to establish
system availability specifications.
10
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I. lllustrative Example of Availability Specification
The above methods are illustrated in the following example, which
specifies the availability requirements as they relate to an
= extended mission of a manned orbital vehicle. In particular, the
analysis deals with the maintainability tradeoffs it,terms of
.r maximizing the total systems effectiveness and minimizing such
cost factors as maintenance times and the weight and volume of
spares. The methodology makes use of a computer simulation to
\ determine:
I) Whether to use redundant parts, carry spare modules for easy
'_ _" replacement, make repairs in flight, or how best to combine
.._ .! the_e approach,_s;
_ ! 2) Whether to use built-in automatic failure location devices
or auxiliary test gear;
_'_ 3) What the effect is of replacement times and the required
-' " weight and volume of spare modules on the equipment
availability;
• 4) The applications for which cou_monality of parts can be used
effectively;
5) The techniques that can be used to improve the maintainability
• per unit weight, volume, or other associated cost factors.
' . Almost every aspect of reliability/availability/maintainabillty
design is a matte of compromise. If every conceivable require-
:._ ment in the way of spare parts, tools,'test equipment, and
. ;; trained repairmen is foreseen and provided, the space vehicle
, > _ would become a combination warehouse and factory and never get
off the ground. Because of the long mission times and the large
number of system parts involved, it is practically impossible to
,_ ,_ achieve acceptable dependability/availabillty through rellabil_.ty
_ "_ alone, but it would be equally impossible to maintain an unreliable?'J,,
-'_ system. Furthermore, these factors Pust be considered from the
./_., . standpoint of the value of the mission because, if dependability/
-_.;_,% o availability were the primary mission goal, man would stay on the
" -_:-_ ground, The following discussion does not include all factors,
:-.":.:_. but does indicate the scope of the problem.
:_,_ Initially, there are the tradeoffs between reliability,
• .i''>_! maintainability and availabillty. The increase of rellabillty
"_:_'i'ii__iI through the use of more reliable components, of parallel and
standby redundncy, of hlgher standards of quality control, of more
• exacting _equirements for assembly and checkout, etc, is limited
by the law of diminishing returns, and, in the case of manned
space mission with extended lifetimes, the value of maintainability
_ . is easily seen. II
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Next, there are the tradeoffs associated with "indenture" level
or the size or amount of circuitry or equipment included in each
replacement module. The lower the indenture level, the smaller
the replacement modules and the less replacement of properly
operating equipment; but locating the failure, gaining access to
the failed part, and replacing it would be expected to take _"
longer. The penalty, in terms of failure effect on the mission
objectives, would depend on the importance of the objectives
, _ involved, the criticalness of their scheduling, etc Also, the "_
optimum indenture level would depend on whether the replaced
,j modules are to be serviced. Usin_ a higher indenture level has
the advantages of shorter failure location and module replace-
ment times, and, if the replaced module can be repaired, this
would greatly reduce the required number of spares. There would,
however, be a costly penalty associated with the test and repair
equipment needed and providing a trained repairman for the crew.
! Further tradeoffs are associated with the completeness of the
failure location and test equipment, and the required crew training.
Presumably, failure location equipment provided could be so j
complete that the module containing the failed part is indicated
automatically without any further checking. However, this would --_
involve a rather extensive system that would, itself, be subject
to failure. For each type of mission and vehicle, there is some
optimum level of completeness of the failure location equipment
• _ and the associated training of the crew members, etc.
I
To obtain the optimum compromise in these and other aspects, it
is necessary to compare costs and the accomplishment of various
mission objectives. This suggests the use of the concept of
.!
i system cost effectiveness. Cost effectiveness is defined as the
i per unit cost of value received and system effectiveness as the
probability of achieving mission objectives. If some commensurable
value can be assigned to each mission objective, then it is more
_'_ J useful to define system effectiveness as the expected mission
accomplishment in these value units and system cost effectiveness
.'_, as the per unit cost of this expected accomplishment. This pro-
_. vides a single quantity for comparison and reduces the reliability, ,
maintainability and availability, design problem to finding the
.... approach that yields the maximum system cost effec¢iveness
o
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The approach is to use a computer program to simulate th_
performance of a set of mission objectives along with a history
of the failure and maintenance actions performed on the various
system elements based on failure and repair or module replace-
ment times chosen randomly from specified probability
,- distributions. The purpose of the simulation program, however,
is not to show what can happen in one particular case, but to
indicate the distribution of events along with their probabilities.
2. Application to a Sample Program
: To gain a better understanding of some of the relations involved,
_he simulation program was used to study indenture level tradeoffs
in a typical attitude control computer as it might be incorporated
in the attitude control system of a manned orbital space station.
, This piece of equipment was selected because it is typical of
_i spaceborne equipment and because reasonable estimates can be made
of the various pertinent parameters such as the mean time to
failure and the fault location and repair times. A mission time
of 1000 hr was selected, during which time a set of idealized
experiments were assigned a representative range of performance
• times, critical times, availability coefficients, etc. The
importance of each branch to each mission is given in terms cf __
a set of a priori objective coefficients.
Five representative mission objectives were selected. The aim was
to have mission objectives with a range of performance times,i
allowed failure effects, critical downtimes, and availability
coefficients. To prevent complication of tt_ results, the avail-
.,:" _ ability coefficients were purposely kept low but were varied
;: to have a bas_s for determining the effects and possible flexibility
_ of this variation. The first objective has an objective performance
time as long as the total mission. The equipment must operate for
the entire time to have no failure effect (the allowed failure
,t _ . "i
,_.-,,, _'i effect is zero), and a downtime longer than 1/2 hr would result in
•; "J'_"_':i the failure of this objective (the critical downtime is 0.5). Thesecond objective also has a performance time as long as the mission,
effect is 0.9 of the performance time without taking away from the
success of this objective). The critical downtime is also as long
• as the mission, which _ans that any operation of the equipment
_; .__ ., during the objective performance time will result in at least
. ,_ partial success in meeting the objective The remaining objectives ,_
._';" have performance times of 100, 10, and 1 hr, respectively, and a
-I'11 evaluate the effects of these quantities on the mission achievement.In this study, the mission achievement _as either 1.000 or 0.999for every run, and no further analysis of the failure effect was made.
"_ 13 i
I.
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Four different indenture levels or module arrangements (where
modu]es are the parts to be replaced) were investigated with the
attitude control system. It was assumed that each module was
positioned with holddown screws and connected _nto the remainder
of the system with connectors. The four indenture levels are: -J
i) Single-circuit modules (total, 35 modules);
2) Dual-circuit modules (total, 19 modules); "_
3) Multicurcuit modules (total, 4 modules);
j'
4) Comp)o e system module (total, i module)
Twenty-five runs were made for each indenture level where a run
is the simulation of a complete mission. Each run has a different
! sequence of random numbers so it represents a different possible
mission history.
i The mean time between failures (MTBF) for each circuit in the
attitude control system was computed by summing the mean failure
rates for each component. The mean times for maintenance operations%
were estimated for each indenture level on the basis of the module
size and composition.
The computer simulation results for a typical indenture level is
shown in Table 2. Listed for each run are the weight and volume of
spares required, the combined weight of computer and spare modules,
and the syste_ cost effectiveness (computed using a weight cost
factor of i0 to put the values in a convenient range, a volume
, cost factor of O, and based on the combined weight of computer
systems and spares). These runs are arranged in order of decreasing
cost effectiveness.
The contribution of each run to the system cost effectiveness is
given by the last column in Table 2. From these results, it is
evident that, for this case, the optimum indenture level depends
on the confidence required in meeting the mission objectives
(although the relation between percentage of runs and the
confidence of achieving a given -ystems cost effectiveness is
not discussed here).
14
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!Table 2 Computer Simulation Run Results for Indenture Level A
Miss ion S pares Spares Combined 1
Run. Achievement WeiRht _ Volume in. 3 WeiRht. _ SCE
., 24 0.999 90. i0 3.02 3394.00 2.943
21 0.999 270.20 9.04 3574.10 2.795
ii 0.999 368.30 13.06 3672.20 2.720
\ .. 4 1.000 458.40 15.08 3762.30 2.658
5 0.999 458.40 15.08 3762.30 2.655
18 0.999 458.40 15.08 3762.30 2.655
:_ 2 O.999 548.50 18.09 3852.40 2.593
! ! 1 0.99") 639.40 21.10 3943.30 2.533
6 O.999 639.40 21. I0 3943.30 2,533
' 8 0.999 639.40 21.10 3943.30 2.533
t
! 16 O.999 639.40 21. i0 3943.30 2.533
20 0.999 639.40 21. I0 3943.30 2.533
7 O.999 729.50 24.12 4033.40 2.477
23 0.999 729.50 24.12 4033.40 2.477
14 0.999 909.70 30.15 4213.60 2.371
15 0,999 909.70 30.15 4213.60 2,371 ;
3 0.999 1007 80 33.16 4311.70 2.317 "
12 O.999 I00" .80 33.16 4311.70 2.31v _
17 O.999 IOrJ7•80 33.16 4311.70 2.317
19 0.999 1C37.80 33.16 4311.70 2.317
I0 0.999 II_1.70 39.20 4435.60 2.252 '
13 O.999 1131.70 39.20 4435.60 2.252
' 25 0.999 1131.70 39.20 4435.60 2.252
22 0.999 1861.10 63.32 5165.00 1.934
i 9 O. 999 2984.80 102.51 6288.70 1. 588
i
t
i
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The tradeoff between indenture level and dcwntime js not apparent
_ because the allowed failure effects, critical downtimes, and the
_. objective coefficients assigned to the various mission objectives
were such that the mission achievement was equally high for all
indenture levels. For more critical mission objectives, this would
not be the case, and the additional tim_ required to locate the ""
, failures and replace the failed modules at the lower indenture level _i
would result in a significant decrease in the mission achievement;
\ _ this would have to be weighed against the advantage of the small "_
weight of spares.
_- _ Another factor contributing to the lower weight and volume of spares i
' _ _ required for the lowest indenture level (A) is the high con_nonaltty. !
The 35 modules are of five types, which reduces the spare_ require-
"_ ment considerably. For higher indenture levels, the ratio of the
:_ number of modules to the number of types is shown as follows:
I) Indenture Level A, 35 modules, _
5 types, commonality ratio = 7.0;
| 2) Indenture Level B, 19 modules,
_ 5 types, commonality ratio = 3.8;
f
3) Indenture Level C, 4 modules,
2 types, commonality ratio = 1.0;
4) Indenture Level D, I module,
I type, commonality ratio = 1.0.
•,:" In the attitude control computer selected, this commonality occurs
because nmny of the elements and branches perform similar tasks.
In many other systems, the different elements would perform
distinctive tasks, and commonality could be increased only at t_
expense of the efficiency or performance of the system.
_'"" 3, Conclusion
_,. The problem of determining the expected range of failure/ "
_!_' maintenance/availability histories, spare parts and maintenance "
._._ equipment requirements, and the resulting effects on the system
cost effectiveness for manned space vehicles wlth extended mission
_,': times is ideally suited to the s_.mulatlon approach, However, "
"_ " developing a simulation program is only part of the problem;
i also Include effo:t to determine the sisnli'Icant factors and
"'_j how to incorporate these factors in the program to Improve the_rogram as a design tool to specify Slven requlremnts for
maintainability, reliability, and availablUty.
16
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In the following chapters, the analytical basis for the
formulation of operational availability and examples of practical
" problems are discussed. Although the treatment of this subject
_ is specifically aimed at the deflnition/design phase, the
_ theoretical considerations and parameters are also present in the
; -" concept analyses areas.
!
tl
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tLI. SCOPE AND CRITERIA
The prob1_m o[ specifying operational availability requirements,
•. either at the system state, or at the system element level is a
complex of analytical and design actions that involve a wide '.
":' range of design variables and disciplines. As in the design of '
:_ 'lunch vehicle system to achieve a given performance capability, i\ k- -_
the design for operational availability is a series of iterative
actions in which sizing of system elements permits comparing.. • what _, _bta:_Lable versus what is needed. At each stage of design, i
choices exist between both desLgn alternatives and the system i
_i performance parameters involved in meeting the mission require- !
,_ ments. £he decision criteria must, therefore, be provided at each
design m,_:.._.ty, and these criteria mLst be consistent with each
"_' level ot detail. The respective design interaction, and the
corre]ati,ms uxisting among some of the availability parameters,
provide, both a rationale ar.d a baseline for refining the desiRn
,. solution.
! The subs_.q,_,..'.[imp}ementation of a design protocol for the
d_t_rr_:i_,4_,_1 of system l,perational availability involves the _
"_, de]_q,-'alio, _,f those functional areas and associated analytical P
techx_q,,::; that permit quantification of the availability
i pat-,met, rs H._ever within each given functional area, detailed
a_,,:_y,',.:are required to determine, in depth, the respective
, ,_ param_'tric performance characteristics and their interactions on
relat,zd subsystems. In this respect, the discipline of systems
_, a._alysis furnishes the necessary methodologies t_ assess various
alternatives as well as conduct optimization and suboptimization
' 'i studies.
D,:sign Ap.proach - As in most design problems, _izing and optimization
.,'. of design is an endeavor to strike a balance between _everal
'" '.,. variables that are often conflicting. Sizing to achieve an opera-
""'{," tional a,_ailabl]ity i=_ no exception. In a m_intalnable system, the
balance is achieved between reliability of the system and _he
_'ii::';. maintenance provisions. This balance i_ usually established on "
the basis of a criterion that describes the value of the system and
•.I-i_ program. The value criteria _n an aerospace program will usually
_I include the following factors:I) Cost;
2) Development risk;
3) Weigh_ ;
18
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4) Safety;
. 5) Size;
6) Schedule.
The implementation of a balanced design _akes the form of a
' detailed examination of the requirements to achieve the objective
\ i ,. (in this case, the degree and amount of operational availability)
t
as well as the postulation of alternatives that will satisfy the
J _ program/system requirements. The closing on a compatible design
' configuration of operational and support elements is essentially
. , a progressive process.
.'I Figure 2 illustrates the interaction between the respective
'- system design disciplines and the basic elements comprising
i each functional area. The analytical tools required, as well
1 as the parameters generated at each point in the design process,
, yield an operational policy for implementing the design
decisions in accordance with a set of criteria. The overall
analysis uses simulation models and hypothetical scenarios for
estimating the system performance characteristics. Subsequent
verification of these system concepts provides a baseline from b.I
which further refinements are made. This iterat_ve process
converges rapidly in terms of satisfying the original require-
ments and objectives. Figure 3 is an example of some of the
elements that enter into the maintainability/reliability designi
process. The resultant design solutions (limited by technology
z available) include an assessment of the critical or most
++' +i sensitive desi&n or perfornance parameters. The analytic
+;! formulation of some typical design problems is treated in the ,
' J following chapters. The basic areas of redundancy, wearout,
+_ mainten+nce policies, failure and repair rates, as well as
operational factors are considered. Both analytical approxi-
..' nmtions and simulation techniques are demonstrated as viable+,
_?'J tools in the solution of larse-scale system problems.
0
•
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II!. ANAL_'rlCAL DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY.................................... f ............................
A full duscripcion of the availability function and the associ-
ated operational practice of a given syste:0 that can be
rn_intained requires the specification of:
l) Tileeq,ipment failure and repair processes;
_ 2) The system configuration;
i
3) The repair and maintenance policy;
4) The state in which the system is to be defined as fa,_led.
'" i Within the _ast few years, m,_ch attention has been paid to an
analytical technique known as Markov Processes. Mathcmaticdl
models based on Markov Processes have found wide applicability
in the fie_ds of biology, engineering, physics, and the social
sciences. In general, this technique uses the essential concept
that the probability of obtaining a particular outcome on any
trial (given a sequence of independet,= trials) depends only on
the outcome of the direct]y proeedlng trial, rbis implies
a knowledge of the conditional probabillty associated wlth every
I pair of outcomes. In additlo11, the space of all possible , ,admissible states and how ransl icus r made over a sequence of
trials must be adequately deflneo. Thus, for example, one may
define the states_ of a piece of equipment as operating or failed,
, i and then consider how transitions are made back and forth from
each of the possible states. It is essentially chls formulation
"1.. that is applicable to the analytical description of availability.Furthermore, if _he conditional transition p_obability is con-, _ s_r.nt, the resultant l_rkov Process is stationary. In thediscussion that follows, the development of an analytical model
using the Ymrkov Process is developed under these conditions.
_7 ,_ To employ a Harkov representation, it is assu_ed that the
individual equipment fails in accordance with the nc&ative i
cxponential distribution, and the times-to-repair are also
:.... e_po_entially distributed, i
_.." : t If an item of equipment is deligned so that those items that are f
_i!_i_1 expected to fail frequently have a relatively short repair time
_';i" compared with those items that fail infrequently, an exponential '
distributior, of repair times is observed. On the ether hand, if
• every part in an item of equipment has the ssse failure rate,
and each takes equally as lon8 to repair, a rectangular or
uniform distribution of repair times results. The induced
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distribution of equipment repair times can be more easil." con-
' trolled by the designer than can the distribution ef tin_.,_ to
failure. For example, if a _ew p_rts contribttte the greatest
percentage of equipment failures, the system designer can make
sure that they are easily accessibl_ for rapid replacement.
.o
It i3 assumed that the equipment faiJure cumulative distribution
, is described by a negative exponential distrib,_,tion, F(t) = lee - _/ t
.. so that the conditional failure probability in the interval t,
, t + dt is )_ de. It is also assumed that the major pottier, of
failures can be repaired in a short time, while those items that
T fail infrequently take _ long time to _epair. Therefore, the
equipment repaZr cumulative distributiQn_ are _vonentially
distributed, and given by G(t) " l-e P" . Also, the probability
of completing a repair in the interval t, t + dt, given that it
: was not completed at time t, is _/dt.
In this formulation for maintained systems, it is necessary to
: develop the forward and backward differential equatio_ls that
describe how transitions are made Oack and forth from state to!
state. If it is assumed that _,hen an item of equipment fails
it is immediately detected and repair is begun, and the times-to-failure and times-to-repeir are each independently exponentially
distributed, the resulting Barker Process is referred to as a
"Birth and Death Process." The Birth and Death Process describes1
, 3 system's availability in term of transient and st_.ady-state
' components. For systems that are co be operating contlnuously
1 for a long time, the steady-state solutions are usually sufficient.
The basic equatl_ns for this simple formulation are developed
in Appendix B, as well as some significant variations, such
, ' i as partial repair, the case of n equipments with r repair sen
: (r = n, and r < n), as well as e. t_o-equipment items redandant
system. In addition, the problem of wearout, which involves :
a non-Harkovisn Process, is decomposed into a sequence of
Markovlan Processes by segmenting the input distribution into
• several exponential phases. This technique is also discussed
in detail in Appendix B.
For systems that can be maintained, there are tw_ figures of merit
that are uaually of interest. The extent to which a system can
"' • . be expected to be in a state or condition to pe:'fonn its assigned
function vithln an established time frame and under given envlron-
_ mental conditions is referred to as the system's "ava;labillCy."
This approach his been treated in detail in the previou_ chapters.
Still another figure of merit that Is relevant to maintained systems
is the "HaSh gecurrcnoe _Lma." This is the length of time to
return to an acceptable Atate from a failed state. Sometimes th.s
23
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figure of merit is called Mean Single Downtime. The importance
of the Mean Recurrence Time is obvious, because availability is
,_ concerned with the total time the system spends in acceptable
states and does not indicate how this time is d_stributed.
>, For example, in a lO,000-hr period, the system may fail once _nd
down for a 10-hr duration, yielding an availability of 0.999.
f On the other hand, the system may fail I0 times in tbe same perioa
and be down for I hr each time, also yielding an availability of
0.999.
Durations of single downtimes can also be related to a penalty
, _ _ cost that must be paid for each consecutive unit time the system
_ _ is unavailable. An air traffic control system that establishes
" flight plans and directs the landing and takeoff of aircraft is
_, _ , _ an example. Long durations of si-,gle downtimes may mean queuing
•_ at takeoff, thereby delaying schedules, lost flights, and so on.
•i In this sense, it would be preferable to have a higher system
" - failure r_te with shorter durations of single do_time incidences
than a low system failure rate with long durations of single do,_n_-
time ihcidences.
During the preliminary design phases, consideration is usually
• ! given to the exrocted repair time of all items in the system
and which failures would require the system to be down. A good j
i example is the case of bearing supports in a radar pedestal.
Although the failure rate of bearings may be relatively low, it
. , may take several hours to replace one, and the radar set would
; - have to be "off the air." Therefore, although the steady-state
{' availability may not be significantly affected, the eventuality
_ "_ \ of a bearing failure may cause serious consequences--the radar
_ i jf\._._ would be unavailable for several hours, f_t the preliminarydesign phase, this effect must be considered and alternative
approaches that would reduce the duration of single downtime
. , without significantly increasing system cost evaluated. One
'" , ,','"_' approach is to use hlgh-level redundancy and duplex the radar
"'_'_. _:" pedestal. However, this alternative is costly. Another approach
......,.., is a lower level of redundancy where only the bearing gear
_i_,,' _ _ supports are duplexed to permit repair of a single bearing
:' _ - failure without affecting _ystem downtime,
• 'i[ ,," ,• ' '
_ 24
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iIt may be well at this point to distinguish between the concept
of statistical expectation and the steady-state, or state of
statistical equilibrium. The expected value is simply the average
value of the availability function over all possible values of the
variable. If we had a large number of equipment items that had been
"' operating for some time, then at any particular time we would
expect the number of equipment items that are in state 0 (available)
to be NP . Thus, the ratio of the number of equipment items
-- availabl_ to the total number of equipment items is simply NP /N = P .
0 0
J When w_ are concerned with steady-state solutions, we are
, postulating the existence of limits, i.e., the steady-state
; distribution will maintain itself ideally in an infinitely large
ensemble. The Markovian formulation does not consider fluctuations
in the individual items of equipment. For example, if a particular
equipment item fails on the average every i00 hr of operation and
takes I hr to repair, its steady-state availability is P = I00/i01.
0
However, the range of the time of equipment failure is (O,oo).
Thus, the steady-state availability I00/I01 says nothing about the
fluctuations of an individual equipment it=m's availabilities.
It tells us that, in an infinitely large ensemble of equipment
items, for each item that never fails, there is one that fails
the instant it is "put-on." For a single-equipment item system
(including some significant variations) it is not too difficult
to develop the availability distribution and its moments. How-
ever, for complex configurations the analytic effort is intractable
and Monte Carlo simulation techniques usually have to be employed.
In this respect, it is essential to conduct a statistical analysis
of the simulation results to ootain confidence limits and assess
the effects of sampling. The question of how many samples to run
is usually a compromlse between computer costs involved aud the
accuracy of the results desired, l
!
.i! ,
l
t
,!
J
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'_ IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY
" A. _NIMUMCOST CRITERIA FOR A GIVEN AVAILABILITY
u
When operational availability is used to address a problem of ""
! meeting a t_me constraint, i.e., a specific schedule time, the
analysis is concerned with the selection of operational modes ;
- o
_ in terms of time, spares, and expected failure rates. When
_' availabil_v is defined _o mean the probability that the system
will be in an acceptable condition in any given state, the
analysis is concerned with either a particular solution
• ' (evaluation of initial conditions) or long-term (steady-state)
solution of the basic avail'_bility equation. In th_s ca_e, i
the sizing of MTBF _nd MTTF serve as goals or allocations from
which and definition design can be performed.system concept
One example of the latter case is d scribed in Appendix C. In
: this cesign problem, the steady-state, _ong-term availability
of a system in a given mission state is of prime concern. Inis
example describes a particular problem in which the given
availability and minimum cost are the criteria for selection.
In addition to the specification of the factors that contribute !
' to MTBF and MTTF, this example problem al_) shows that the !
sensitivity o! figures of merit require testing co verify that the
" indicated results are valid. In this case, a simple _int _,i probability computation verifies the selection.
Tbe analytical development of this technique for a uniform
• distribution is given in Appendix D. The results are quite
straightforward, and the derivation may be applied to various
,i other overlapping probability densities.
• ", B. PROBABILITY O_ LAUNCH ON TIME
The launch-on-t_me concept of availability can be addressed in a
:'L-_." manner similar to the example given in Appendix C. The decision
as to how to achieve a given level of probability of readiness
::. is concerned with apporticulng between MTBF and MTTF and then
"": allocating these values to _he technical paramete"s of the system.
26
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There is, h_aever, yet another approach to solving this same
generic type of problem. Ehis is illustrated in Appendix E.
This example is an operational analysis aimed at selecting
mission state duration, as well as the generation of a concept
to meet a giJen probability of two successful launches. In this
case, the MTBF of the system is assumed fixed. This is a
reasonable condition because the vehicle design leads the ground
system design in the development process. This analysis has as
its objective to establish the launch operations strategy and the
reliability and logiseics requirements that yield an acceptable
! operational a _ilabillty. The exact nature of this analysis
i is described below:
i
It is assumed that the system concept is made up of a launch
vehicle and a mission payload module. The problem is then to
launch _ao payloads within a specified launch period. The
operational analysis provides a solution to establish the launch
operations strategy and the reliability and support requirements
that best m_et the availability objectives. The variables in
this analysis are:
i) The probablltty of holds during operations on the launch pad
due to, _[•
a) Launch vehicle malfunctiot,_,
4
b) Spacecraft malfunctions,
! c) ,_Ii other causes;
2) Recycle of the launch vehicle in _he event of a malfunction ,
'. on the launch pad ;
I
3) Racycle of the spacecraft in the event of a malfunction on
'_ =he launch pad;
4) Spares provisioning and replacement time for,
_, a) Launch vehlcle,
b) Spacecraft;
5) The duration of the launch period; l
6) Turnaround time between launch attempts.
: 27
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Dealing at this level of design_major system decisions are made
such as :
I) What is the optimum time for launch operations as a
function of reliability of the major system elements?
• 2) What are the system element spares that yield the greatest
probability of mission success?
"_: To illustrate this operational analysis, a hypothetical case is
i " developed in which it is desired to perform two launches of a
_, vehicle and its payload• In this example, the analyses resulted
in:
t
I) Estimates of reliability for the system elements (launch :
vehicle and payload); .
"_ 2) Recycle time for the system elements in the event of
malfunction;
'_ 3) Limitation on the number of malfunctions.
Furthermore, previously determined mission analysis studies have
selected three operational concepts for analysis:
i) Candidate I,
,!• a) 22-day launch period,
' b) lO-day turnaround (launch-to-launch),
:t
c) Spare launch vehicle and payload;
2) Candidate 2,
a) 30-day launch period,
b) 16-day turnaround,
c) No launch vehicle with spare payload;
3) Candidate 3,
a) 30-day launch period,
b) lO-day turnaround (launch-to-launch),
c) No launch vehicle with spare load. L
28
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Table 3 shows the initial conditions that apply to these three
cases.
Table 3 Conditions and Assumptions
"" I, Probability of a malfunction or delay during any one launch
attempt (can reoccur) :
!
\. ,, Launch vehicle 0.05
Payload 0.05
All other causes 0.05
" - ' 2. Recycle Times (malfunction-to-launch) :
"" _ Payload recycle 19 days
/
: Launch vehicle recycle 14 days
_,, Replace integrated
launch vehicle and
paylead 5 days
f Remove payload from
launch vehicle and
replace 9 days]
i All other causes 3 days J
, 3. The payload Is limited to a total of 2 recycles.
%
4. The probability of the payload requiring recycle before
:! launch pad operations = 0.05 (can reoccur). This applies
:" _ to both prelaunch and recycle ol_rotions.
_;_ ! 5. The probability of the launch vehicle sustaining a malfunction
° _ during recycle that would preclude launching on time = 0.05.
?
6. The program requirement for probability of two launches
"', " _ within a specified time period Is 0.015.
z ,w,
_ 29
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°_ The detailed analysis of these three candidates is included in
Appendix E. For this sample problem, the analytical approach is
relatively simple and straightforward. It would have required more
complex methods and techniques had the .....,_.,.,,,_,_-_of variables
entering into the decision been larger.
t_
Table 4 compares the three approaches in terms of percentage o_
launch-on-time risk. The second candidate differs from the first
\_ in that the launch period was longer (22 to 30 days) and the ..
i turnaround time was longer (i0 to 16 days). These changesessentially counteracted each other. The significant difference
Ir is that a launch vehicle and payload were considered in Candidate
'_ _ I. Deletion of the spare set increased the launch vehicle risk
from 0.30 to 5.46%.
The third candidate differs from the second in that the turnaround
time has been reduced from 16 to i0 days. This reduces the total
risk from 5.98 to 0.85%. Most of the risk in _;o. 3 is due to the
launch vehicle, because no spare is provided. This candidate
compares favorably with No. i, although it is not quite as good.
Table 5 compares the approaches in terms of the number of
malfunctions that can be tolerated on :he launch pad during the
! launch period. The No. 2 approach is _e_y restrictive; only
one malfunction could occur in the latnch vehicle and that had
_ to occur in the first vehicle. The third candidate can tolerate
more malfunctions than No. l, depending 0_ where they occur;
' _ however, there is an increased risk of a malfunction occurring
i during launch vehicle recycle. The first approach allows for
• ._ one launch vehicle recycle, while No. 3 allows a maximum of three.
The more recycles, the higher the risk.
• The following conclusloas were drawn from this study:
I) The launch-on-time risk for No. 3 is substantially less than
for No. 2 and compares favorably with No. i. This was
achieved by reducing the turnaround time _.rom 16 to I0 days;
2) Candidate No. I meets the allocated launch-on-time risk of
I.5%;
3) Most of the risk is caused by :he launch vehicle because a
spare is not a_ailable;
4) The Imunch-on-t_me risk ¢,:nn_,,be reduced by further
reduction of the turnarc,lnd time or extension of the launch
period;
30
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Table 4 Comparison of Launch-on-Time Risks
Launch-on-Time Risk, %
Candidate iCandidate Candidate
; ., _ 1 I 2 ,l
Payload 0,32 O.54 0.09
_ .- Launch Vehicle 0.30 5.46 0.76
#
All Other Causes 0.05 0.01 0.00
J i
Total Risk, % 0.66 5.98 0.85
No. i - 22-day launch period
10-day turanround
Spare launch vehLcle and payload
No. 2 - 30-day launch period
16-day turnaround
_ No spare launch vehicle '
With spare payload
No. 3 - 30-day launch period
,; lO-day turnaround
: No spare launch vehicle ,
, ! With _pare payload
!
i? •
i
a
t
i
1
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Table 5 Ma:.imum Number of Malfunctions That Can Be Tolerated
+ (Two Launches)
, Ma l_function _
_ Candidate Candidate Candidate ""
.,. l ., 2 3
Payload 2 2* 2 or 3 -
Launch %chicle 2 i 2 or 3J . .,
_+, ,+
!
. .f All Other Causes 3 4 6
+ *Both malfunction_ must occur in the first
vehicle; otherwise, we can tolerate one pay-
load malfunction in Vehicle I OR one payload
malfunctior _n Vehicle 2.
Must occur in Vehicle i. We caLmot tolerate sf_
any launch vehicle malfunctions in Vehicle 2.
t
4
.,, ,
• "+ + +,i+-.,,+.+. !+.," +_++.+,+
,t • '_'++i_
2 |
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5) An increase in turnaround time or a decrea._e in the launch
period would result in a significant increase in the launch-
on time risk;
6) The launch-on-time risk could be significantly reduced by
: .. providing a standby launch vehicle and payload. This would
also provide flexibility to changes in turnaround time and
lau:_chperiod. However, a spare launch vehicle and rayload
., is not warranted by this analysis. A more sophisticated
analysis would have to be conducted to determine if such
, a selection should be made;
_',! 7) On the basis of this analysis, Candidate i is selected
because it provides the most margin with respect to the
system risk requirement.
33
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!C. MONTE CARLO AVAILABILITY SIMULATION
"' The Monte Carlo method may Driefly be described as the device
of studying a real-world phenomena by means of a simulated
mathematical process, using random sampling to structure the ,.
+ solution and establish statistical inferences. The device
is certainly not new. Moreover, the theory of mathematical
: simt iation has been a subject of study for quite some time,
, and the novelty of the Monte Carlo method does not lie here.
i The novelty lies rather in the suggestion that where complex, situations exist that demand numerical solutions not readily
• _ obtainable by standard analytical metLtods, there may exist a
_" mathematical simulatiot, process with statistical distributions
I or parameters that adequately approximate the real-world
,_ circumstances. In these insta_.ces it may actually be more
+
efficient and economical to constr-Lct such a process a.d compute
the statistics, rather than attempt to use deterministic methods
to describe the system.
: Historically, the o_iginal von Neumann-Ulam concept seems to
have been that Monte Carlo specifically designated the use
of random sampling procedures for treating complex deterministic
_+ mathematical problems not easily amenable to numerical solution.
I
However, some define Monte Carlo to be the exclusive use of
random sampling procedures to treat problems, whether of a
_ deterministic or prooabilistic sort. Others demand that the
sampling be sophisticated (involve the use of some variance
' _ reducing technique) to qualify as Monte Carlo; they reserve
the names straight+forward sampling, experimental sampling, or
• model sampling for the cases where purely random samplilg is
• used. However, the economics of computing changes so rapidly ,
' ' with the advent of f_ster and faster machines that Monte Carlo
methods arc being successfully applied to more ahd more
sophisticated and complex problems. The situation now is that
in common usage, Monte Carlo is synonymous with any use of
random sampling in treatment of either determinlstic or
probabilistlc problems.
. +,
The application of the Monte Carlo simulatio_ technique to
operational availability is given in Appendix F. This model
computes the system availability of a launch vehicle, which
involves a sequence of test,-, and storage of specified system
and subsystems. Figure 4 illustrates in schematic form the ' I
launch vehicle storage and '.,;stcycles.
34
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The development of tile storage and test cycles ks illctstrated in
Appendix F, along with the simulation results. It may be con-
" eluded that:
/
i) The most important factor af[ecting the _vailability of the
; launch vehicle is failure rate of parts; ""
2) Availability after each storage and test cycle drops off
continuously; "-
3) Probability of detecting a failure is relatively (wit.qin
normal ranges) insensitive to availability;
4) Length of launch vehicle storage (for examplt _, 12 months or
36 months) will cause availability to fall off sharpiv "
In running this Monte Carlo simulation, the basic data w_,r_
accumulated over a 36-month period, using Marker t_ansition
matrices for storage and test operations. Thus, the sample
I_ sizc was large, so that statistical variations weft. minimized.
• The illustrative examples presented focus attention on tat
_ various applications and di[ferent types ot problems _,r ._._d
._ iv determining operational availability. The analytic ,I concepts
developed provide a framework for structuring a broad class of
•_ problems, and furnish insight into the subtle mechanisms of
obtaining real-world solutions that are u_.cful to the engineer '
• and the designer. The subsequent interpretation and integration
i of these results into a comprehensive methodological design toolis a continuing process, combining both the skill and analytical
s ability of the design team. Note that a total system approach
' _ involves a complete effectiveness analysls of the essential
parameters of operational availability in terms of the performance
characteristics of the overall system. Thus, although operational
availability has been treated as a separate topic, its effective
impact on related subsystems and other functional requirements
must also be examined. The end result is to yield a design
concept that is analytlcally sound, economlcally feasible, and • '
capable of being implemented in a real-world application.
In stmuary then, operational availability may be approacb_.d fro_
several apparently dlffcrent and divergent vtewpolnts. However,
_.t should be observed that this basic parmraeter must be analyzed
both ova systems and individual basts to achieve an integrated
and balanced design.
!
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IAA. CONSI.DE TI.O.N§.FOA EI_EC
MODELS
"" A. AN._.YYIC MODELS FOR EFFECTIVENESS EYALUATION
: -" Any meaningful application of the systems performance effective-
ness concept to a particular project requires a quantitPtive
,_ methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed or actual
system in terms of selected measures, requirements, and decision
' criteria. Until this is done, the concept of systems performance
effectiveness for a pz_ject has little use--except perhaps as a
rallying point for arguments about the advantages of System X
over System Y. The need for a systems performance effectiveness
evaluation methodology begins at the inception of the systtm
life cycle and continues through the succeeding design, develop-
ment, production, test, and operational phases. Despite the
obvious differences in the depth of the analysis applicable to
these phases, the need for a quantitative metho ,_.ogy applies
throughout. _
Evaluation methodologies for systems perform-,=ce effectiveness
characteristics c_n be broadly characterlz.u in terms of two
• approaches--the empirical and the analytic (Ref I).
An empi=Ical methodology is one devoted to data cci_ection and
evaluation of exlst:n$ systems. Thus, i_ is _ossible to evaluate
systems performmce effectiveness by means of performMnc_ obse_-
' rations of system in the field. Nhile this approach is undoubt- ,
edly the most accurate, it is feasible only for systclu or pro-
jects that are very far advanced in their life cycles.
An analytic methodology, on the other hand, is o' that derives
_j
• its results by inference, and use, a set of assumptions and pro- i
cedures as a framework to compute an effectiveness description !,
- • of the lystem in question. This descriptive system frame work :,
• is called an analytic model, ano the description of System X in !
- these terms is called the analytic model of System X. I'
- | •
• .! . Purely empirical or purely analytic methodologies are, oi course,
not very useful. The former yields highly authoritative data %
• too late to be useful, while the latter yields answers unsup-
ported by facts. In practice, a btl_nce is sought. _i_8 bal-
i ance will normally chan|e during the life cycle of a system. As
3?
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data about the behavior of the system become more available, the
-_ analytic model gradually merges into am empirical model; as the
data become more available and as confidence in their value in-
creases, statistical sample data supplant the assumptiors.
Analytic models, moreover, usually remain useful even with re _rd
: to the empirical data obtained from system samples ta" en during ""
:_ acceptance tests Also these data often require interpretation
" ,
_ _ simply because it is impractical to conduct tests that "e svffi-
' _ ciently elaborate to yield statistically significant efiective- --
ness data directly.
;... The need for or,alytic models to predict systems perforn,_._ce
¢ effectiveness thus emerges from the need to evaluate the effec-
,_ tiveness before the syctem has been in use for many years. The
._ following discussion considers the analytic models--with he ,
understanding that empirical methods will always De req,,ired to
provide i_pu_s for the anal_sis.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN EFFECTIVENESS MODEL (rEF 2)
, There are certain general characteristics that any mathematical
m.del should have to be a useful tool to predict effectiveness.
i 'these are:P
i ]) Independence iron design assumptions If the concept of ;q
, -, effectiveness is to be applied as _ technical management i
:,'t_._ tool, there is a demand that the effectiveness-analysis !
_ tr :hnique, and consequently the analytic model, be capable !,P
of evaluating alternative (or mooified) system designs with _!
" respect to a f_xed set of mission models and variables. To i
" i whatever extent the analytic model presupposes system design !
.i'._,! co_figurationq or characteristics, the model is not able to
-:' _-,--'_ evaluate alternative dasigns that are not within these con-
straints, and hence it may not provide a basis for compari-
- :..:_.- son or optimization. For ex_nplc, if th_ analytic model is • ;
built in terms of a given system-design configuration, other
_._ design configurations may be inequitably treated if subjectedto the same analysis.
38
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2) Usefulness throughout the system life cycle - The analytic
model should be one that can be used throughout the system
life cycle. In the early stages of the cycle, relatively
few data are available on the statistical or performance
; capability of the system, and a substantial number of assump-
"" tlons must be made to permit the analysis. As the life cycle
progresses through design, development, test, and implementa-
• tion, additional design and sample test data ordinarily become
; • available. _,e analytic model, therefore, should be designed
_ to accommodate these changes in inputs, and yield successive
• systems performance effectiveness predictions throughout the
! life cycle, with increased confidence in the results.
3) Realism in the analytic assumptions - The physical and mathe-
matical assumptions on which the model is founded must be
realistic with respect to the expected characteristics of the
mission and system operations. There is a great temptation
to construct analytic models based more on mathematical ele-
gance than on realism.
4) Tractability of the evaluation - For the model to be usable,
• it must give numerical answers when exercised. This implies
the model must be quantitative even in the face of limited _w
, data and it must be amenable to computation. Clearly, this
model characteristic must be traded off against the character-
istic of realism. The art of modeling consists, in large , '
; measure, of establishing this balance.
)
J
t
, ' C. SELECTING AN EFFECTIVENESS MODEL
There appear to be three fundamental classes of considerations
j that enter into the se1.ction of an appropriate effectiveness ,"
._ model--the outputs required for system management and optimiza-
I tlon, the nature of the systems to be analyzed, and the mission
. • characteristics to be employed.
i '
. 1. Outout CQnsiderations
!" The definitions of the variables, requtrements, and decisioncriteria influence the selection of an appropriate effectivenessmodel. The following questions are typical of those that mustbe answered :
39
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I) Can the system-oriented performance variables be identified
with specific hardware, or are they more closely tied to
o_rall system bphavior, including software?
2) Was an iterative methodology emplo)ed to establish the re-
quirements and decision criteria? (_he requirements on the
model themselves could change during the iterative procedure, "-
and these changes must be incorporated.)
3) Is there one principal performance variable _hat corresponds ..
to one princi[al system functirn, or is the system called
upon to do many things?
4) Will the utility and tradeoff data permit the results of
effectiveness analysis to be expressed in terms of discrete
quantities, or will probability distributions be required to !
describe systems performance effectiveness adequately?
5) Are the variables binary (success/failL_e) or multivalued?
2. System Considerations
System considerations concerning the choice of an effectiveness L
model have their greatest effect on the statistical and logical
assumptions that underlie the model. In a given system, it may _
be uniquely possible to identify subsystems with their corres-
ponding functions, and in such a case the effectiveness evalua-
tion is simplified. On the other hand, il interaction of sub-
system functions is expected, particularly with degraded modes
of operation, the model must incorporate this flexibility ol
interaction. Additionally, the analytic model often incorporates
assumptions concerning the statistical behavior of the system.
These assumptions may be valid for the system in c!uestion, and
they may be consistent with the available data. Finally, the I
scope and complexity of the system must be considered. The
delicate balance between tractability and realism discussed
above must be resolved in terms of anticipated system size (size
being expressed in such terms as the number of components).
•
3. Missio n Consideration _
!In addition to mission effects, described in Subsection I, aseries of representative mission profiles also must be examined _"as part of the model-selectlon process.
l
4o
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The results of the studies discussed elsewhere in this report
are closely involved in this examination. For example, is the
system operating in a steady-state environment, or are the
missions short compared with other statistical time parameters?
In the former case, an equilibrium or steady-state model may be
: .. employed. In the latter case, a mission-sensitive model in
whole or in part is required.
_ Again, is the mission function carried out over a time segment,
or is a point mission involved? Are there one or several critical
mission segments? Do the requirements and decision critL.zd for
systems performance effectiveness change with mission mode? Do
the reliability and maintainability characteristics of the sub-
systems change as a function of a mission cegment?
a. Mission Analysis (Ref 3) - Before analyzing a well-defined
system, let alone developing a new one, it is necessary to know
what the system is supposed to do, i.e., what missions it must
perform. It is relatively easy to establish performance envelopes
for various subsystems that, in turn, enable the system to per-
form one task in one environment. The problem, however, becomes
much more difficult if one must consider many tasks under many
envirolzments. #
One scheme often used is to develop figures of merit. This q
, scheme weights the effectiveness figure for each task by the ,
frequency with which the system may be called upon to perform
, each task. However, systems are developed to satisfy specific
mission requirements that have been formulated on the basis of
:.. specific tools. The best system selected in accordance with
such a scheme may not, therefore, be capable . " responding to a I
, "' specific parameter value that of itself may be extremely serious,
but also may occur very often. Thus, a system may not be satis-
factory from the standpoint of a specific subtask.
v ._ It is possible, howe-er, to alter the method by weighting the
parameter by their severity and expected frequency of occurence,
and thus design the system for some other weighted average of
:_i values. However, this does not solve the problem either, be-
cause optimizing an answer to any average value does not optimize ,
-. the answer to each particular value. Perhaps the solution is to
" ' • develop a procedure to optimize the effectiveness of answering a
suitable, chosen, average that is subject to the achievement of ,
" ' a given effectiveness figure against each specific value.
I
f
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On one hand, it makes little sense to soeak about the average
effectiveness, or the average environment. On the other hand,
, one cannot optimize with respect to a single mission unless the
' system has only one task to perform. Such a procedure, therefore,
leads to all the difficulties associated with suboptimization,
l which resul_s when one tries to optimize a system by optimizing -.
each subsystem.
,_ b. Figure of Merit - Perhaps the difficulty associated with the
formulation of an appropriate figure of merit can be best ex- "-
plained by a discussion of the analogous problem encountered ,
' _ with tl,e parameters of a frequency distribution. For example,
" f with a distribution a population can be charaterized by its mean;
. _ but this does not indicate the variability about this mean. A
measure of variability, called the standard deviation can also
a. oe added to this characterization, i
Yet there will be other properties of the population that are not
_ pictured by any of these characterizations, e.g., the lack of
syn_netry. If the 10th and 90th percentiles are also given, how- i
ever, a more complete picture of the population begins to take
shape. Nevertheless, no finite set of par_,_ters can ever com-
, _¢ pletely describe a real population or its frequency distribution, i _
Similarly, if one wants to know the system-effectiveness figures i
in all situations, something analogous to the frequency distri-
-. bution is needed. Although there may be a figure of merit anal-
ogous to mean in frequency-distribution example, can
the the it
never give all the information about the system.
c. Degraded Performance - At the component level, degradation
can be thought of as measured by the number of failed components.
At the system level, however, degraded perform=nce may refer to
the probability of performing the mission. For example, the
system might be designed to be capable of performing its mission
95% of the time in :.heenvironment. In another environment, how-
ever, it may have only a 90% capability, and this may be consi-
dered degraded performance.
On the other hand, consider a radar-weapons system• Its design
performance consists of being able to pick up an object at a
certain distance, and then being able to assign appropriate
weapons once the object has been correctly classified• A proba-
bility is associated with each subsystem performance and, hence,
also with the system's perfox_ance. If the probability asso-
ciated with any subsystem is reduced, however, the probability
of system performance will also be reduced; this, too, can be
considered degraded performance.
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Models of degraded performance can also be modified so that they
are time-variant. There are, moreover, many other possible defi-
nitions of degraded performance. The one to use, of course, is
the one that is useful in assessing a system. Much current work
is misunderstood because one group does not use the same concept
.. ol system degradation as another.
d. Human F_CtO_S - Concern for human factors falls into three
_ .- major areas--life support, personnel and training, and human
: engineering. It is the goal of life support to maintain and
protect the human by controlling his environment; the goal of
' _ personnel and training is to select, train, and assign the human
. _ for operational tasks; and human engineering provides the design
engineer with the basis for the most effective use of the human
component of the system. In short, the discipline of human
factors in systems performance effectiveness requires that the
man module be considered just as a hardware component--to be
evaluated for cost, reliability, maintainability, availability,
and operability. In addition, the man module must be considered
for trainability.
To achieve these goals in a discipllned fashion, certain procedures _
must be followed. These procedures are not one-tlme events to be
accomplished early in the development phase, but rather are itera-
tire procedures that must be reviewed and changed where necessary
_ just as design is r_ iewed and changed during an equipment's de- '
velopment.
t
• !
D. ANALYTIC FRAME WORKS FOR EFFECTIVENESS MODELS
._
.i
The development of a model that satisfied the conditions cited
• , i! in the preceding section is at best a complicated task. However, r
y" j even under the assumption that such a model is realizable, its
range of application without some types of modification would be
restricted. This is due to the nature of the requirements, dl-
V.:_ . verse operating conditions, and use factors that generally are
an integral part of the specific system. To help solve this
-,i:! problem, an approach that uses a system effectiveness framework
' has been developed. In thls approach, the basic system perform-
..y ' ance effectiveness elements remaln constant for different system
missions and use functions, although the more detailed factors
< underlying the basic elements are subject to change, depending
:,.[_ on the particular problem analyzed.
r
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Several systems performance effectiveness models have been de-
veloped. Table i lists equations for the more general models
used. All these equations concern systems performance effec-
tiveness, but each approaches the subject in a different manner,
; reflecting the needs of the individual user.
/
The following general equations are derived (Ref 4): .,
\ _ ES = EA_ E,
_. .,_ f(F,A,U) = f(Pc' PT) _f(A'D'C)"
Note that properly constructed models of the same system carrying
. out the same mission will give the same evaluation and may even
•.i be mathematically identical. The basic equations given in Table
,, i can only be used for simple systems in simple missions, even
if the equations are assumed to be in matrix form.
Several systems performance effectiveness models are given below.
Emphasis has been placed on describing the framework of each
model rather than on providing a detailed description.
I. The Effectiveness Model (Ref 5)
The first term, performance (P), in the effectiveness model (PAU)
I can be expressed within several frames of reference. In the
single-mission system, the expression is derived from a variety
_ | of measurements, e.g., area debL_yed, tons of cargo or number
I of emitters located and identified. Two
delivered,passengers
important conditons apply: (I) the measurement standard used
':: _ must be applicable to the parameter used to determine the per-
, ! formance level, and (2) the answer derived from exercising the|
i expression must be used with caution because, with other than
I extremely simple systems, the achieved performance capabilityi-.I_ is almost always less than the theoretical performance capability.
:' This circumstance occurs because the design-optimization process
requir s that some tradeoffs be made to achieve optimization of
) single-misslon system, P is expressed as an index representing .
the ratio of the achieved performance level to the theoretical
desired level. In essence, it is a figure of merit even under
the assumption of absolute availability and absolute use.
s
%
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In the case of the multimission system, consideration must also
be given to the i,_teractlon of two Judgments. The first cam-
, prises the assigmnent of weighting (importance) factors to the
several mission modes of the system in such a way that their sum
is I•0. The second comprises the determination of the fraction
of the systemls total mission time that will be devoted to each( e-
of the several mission modes,
\ It is in the multlmission system that the compellln_ reason for
'_ "" using indexes becomes most apparent. Many such systems have
completely disparate standards for measuring the performance of
their various mission modes A comparison or aggregation of per-
iormance indexes that use different measurement standards cannot
be attempted validly. For example, tons of cargo delivered, area
! destroyed, personnel transported, and enemy radar sites located
and identified cannot loglcally be compared or aggregated.
The second term, availability (A), is more complex than the
first• Overall availability is relatively easy to measure, but
separating the overs11 value into factors of reliability, main-
tainability, operability, and supportabillty remains a dtfflcult
task--particularly in regard to prediction of the effect of up-
time or downtime.
The third iystemB performance effectiveness term, utilization
(U), eccounr_ for factors that are introduced by the tactical, '
functional, lo8istlcel, and environmental use of the system; all
. four ere 8 function of the operational doctrine of the system.
:.. Utilization factors represent the degradstlon i_ oystem perform-
ance caused by mission conditions. The following a:e some ex-
, i _mples:
1) Loss of accuracy;
i 2) Increase in part failure rate due to high ambient temperature;
-.. 'I_ 3) Reducti.n in repair-part 4nrailsbillty due to remoteness of
_,i location froaaupply depot;
; 4) Infrequent use of search radar for security reasons.
_.":_ " The utillzation factors, except for analytic exercise of the
. i
model, are relatively constant. However, the assigned values
._ viii chjnse vhenever operational 80818 and criterl_ are modified ,
• in the process of achievin 8 consonence betveen them and technical
_; " 8os18 and criteria.
,¢
_9
i
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The real significance of the utilization factor_ li_-s in their
ability to be varied in both sensitivity and tradeoff analyses
: for optimizing the entire system and its use. The systems per-
formance effectiveness model thus becomes a tool _or bringing
operational ant technical goals and criteria into agreement with)
• , each other.
If the goals and criteria are not in agreement, technical managers
_ t can use the models to demonstrate to their operational counter-
, parts the desirability of changing the operational goals and cri- ""
" teria. In such a demonstration, the utilization factors are#
,_ _ varied to show the impact of the variances on the index of the
._ system's perfo_aance e_lectiveness. If this exercise does not
demonstrate the desirability of changing the operational goals
' _ and criteria, the technical manager can readily understand why
he must revise his goals and criteria to coincide with those of
I the operational manager. In most cases it will become clear to_: both that revisions are necessary on both sides to achieve an
i opt.mum system.
As with the performance and availability indexes, the variances
in utilization indexes must be evaluated in terms of cost con-
siderations and overall worth considerations. Each variance of
a factor affects tht other factors and is, in turn, affected by
varian:es in other factors. At the same time, each variance of
• | a factor has an associated cost that must be considered. Only
i when all factors have been considered in terms of mission accom-, plishment will true performance effectiveness be achieved for
._ the system.
2. Misslon-Oriented S¥|gem-Effectlveneas Model
p
This subsection summarizes the generalized mlssion-orlented sys-
tem-effectiveness model that was developed by Task Group 11 of
WSEIAC._ In the simple case in which the system can only be in
c_._. either a working state or a failed state, the measures of avail-
ability, dependability, and capability concern the following
fundamental questions:
-" -_| *Neavons System £ffectlveness Industry Advisory Cnmmttteet_SEL_), ;
++_ Final Revort of Task Grouv 1I. Prediction Measur¢_nt. AFSC-TR-65-2. " +
.'._-,,_,_ System-Effectiveness Division Air Force Systems Command; January " i1965. (AD-458434, 48455, and 45856)}!
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II) Is the system working at the start of the mission?
2) If the system is workin8 at the start of the mission will it
continue to work througbmut t_. mission?
-" 3) If the system worked throughout the mission, will it achieve
mission success?
'.... Althou_h these questions represent the fundamental aI_proach to
be used in evaluating effectiveness .n a mission-oriented basis,
they are too simplified for purposes of model constructio..
i Horeover, as the systems considered become more complex (e.g.,
there are more than two possible system states) such elements as
degraded modes of operation, multimission requirements, enemy
countermeasures, and _atural environment must also be quantified
in the model.
The basic effectiveness model can be divided into two major ele-
ments--the probability that the system w_ll be in a particular
state at mission-performance time, and the effectiveness of the
systc_ Hen it is in that state, Thus, if effectiveness is
quantified by 8 probability that the system will successfully
meet the mission objectives, each term in the product _ . _ #f
represents the probability that the system will be in a particu-
lar state, and the corresponding term in the _ vector is the
• effectiveness of the system, given that state. For example,
'
" Z {?(system is in state i] .P(mission objectives are
met, given state i] }.
For some types of systems and missions, it may be more desirable
to quantify effectiveness by some performance parameter other
than a probability. For example, the expected mlss distance for
, a missile might be a more meaningful performanc_ pt_maeter than
the probability of ''_ hitting within a specified area. For a
.: . reconnaissance syst.m, the mvezaFe amount of usable information ',
might be appropriate. Figures of merit for these forms are
readily usable by the appropriate quantification of the _ vector.
'. The mission model proposed by t_e NSEIAC Task Group 1! is, in
• essence, mote a model framework for effectiveness e_aluation
than 8 directly applicable set of equations. This 8enerality
is necessary because the ranse of possible eysteem, missions,
_i and depth of analysis precludes the specification of any single
* model.
51
1973003260-055
'i
_Je model framework, based on the availability, dependability,
and capability factors, allows for flexibility in application0
by an anpropriate combination of the associated elements. Ink
t. Volume 3 of the Task Group II report, detailed examples are pre-
._ sented for an airborne avionics system, an intercontinental mis-b
," sile system, a radar surveillance system, and a spacecraft system.
-.
The level of detail at which an analysis is performed will depend
\ _ on the ih_ormation and data available an _ on the purpose of the
evaluation. For one study, a mean repair time may be sufficient ..
_ input for the availabllity evaluation, while for another study
• _: _ such factors as queuing theory, spare parts availability, main-
"_ I tenance efficiency, and periodic-checkout procedures may have to
be incorporated.
. _
_ere are still many different areas that will require further
" "_ research. One major problem is to develop improved techniques
to convert available data into the appropriate vector and matrix
elements of _, D, and _. Better analytic and computational tech-
niques are required to incorporate state changes and those asso-
ciated capabilities that can occur over a continuous interval.
Such factors as state occupancy times and steady-state behavior
may be involved in such analyses. Study also is reconraended on ja means to obtain some measure of "corfidence" in the results of
the effectiveness evaluation, both in the probabilistic combina- _
tion of estimates and in guiding the decision process associated
,_ w_th the evaluation. Computerized _nalytic and simulation methods
, _ are needed for complex systems that generate a very large number
of system states.
•' The WSEIAC model frame work, or similar approach, has been ap-
_ plied to several systems, and has generally been found to be at
reasonable method for evaluating effectiveness on a mission-
oriented basis. Because of the impetus provided by WSEIAC, a
• ,: ._ great deal of research is being sponsored by the military and
__-'..', i! private agencies in order to improve this first effort.
. _ 3. Data Proble_n_
_ The quality of the data used to perform calculations during the
..,,, course of a systems performance effectiveness analysis will have
a significant effect on the accuracy and utility of the results.
_._ Unfortunately, the mathematical model that describes a system •
configuration and behavlcr often is far more precise than the
.' ",',,. input data available• If effectiveness values--obtalned from
an exercise of the system model--are used as relative rather
52
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than absolute values, the quality of the data is usually found
to be adequate. As a general rule, such values are satisfactory
_en the analysis is performed to obtain comparisons between
alternate designs, or to determine the effect of changes on a
specific configuration. If absolute values are required, however,
•- extreme care must be used in selecting the input data, and cau-
tion should be observed in interpreting the results.
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APPENDIX B ANALYTIC DERIVATION OF THE AVAILABILITY FUNCTION
A rather definitive treatment of the rationale and equations
t leading to the derivation and specification of an availability ..
function is given in G. H. Sandler's text, System Reliability
_ Engineering, Prenctice Hall, 1964. In particular, Chapter A5
presents several interesting and appropriate variations, such .
as multiple repairmen, series and parallel redundancy, as well "
as n equipment items that have failed. The intent of this
•_ appendix is to highlight the method for obtaining the basic i
equations for the simplest case of a single equipment system
• and interpret the results in terms of system design approaches.
i= Also, the problem of wearout is treated from a design viewpoint,
_ and a rather simple reduction to a Markovian Process is illus-
trated for the assumptions given.
For the simple single equipment system, we designate two states--
State O (the system is operating) and State i (the system is
t failed and under repair). Now because the conditi.,nal prob-
_ ability of failure in t, t + dt is dt, and the conditional
• : probability of completing a repair in t,t + dt is dt, we have
the following transition matrix:
m
•_ p = •
/i 1-_
The differentia] equations describing the stochastic behavior
of this system can be formed by considering the following:
t probability that the system is in State O t time t + dt
is derived from the probability that it was in State O at time
. t and did not fall in t,t + dr, oz that it was in State I at
time t and returned to State O in t, t + dr. Thus, we have
Po (t+dt) = Po(t) (I-_dt) + Pl(t)Udt + 0 dt.
Similarly, the probability of being in State I at time t + dt
is derived from the probability that the system was in State O
at time t and failed in t,t + dt, or it was in State i at time
t, and the repair was not completed in t,t + dt. Therefore,
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Pl(t + dt) = Po(t) Jkdt + Vl(t)(1 -_dt) + O(dt).
r
]'he term O(dt) in both equations represents the probability
"" of Lwo events taking place in t,t + dr, which is negligible.
: Note that the coefficients of these e4uations represent the
row_ of the transition matrix. As before, toe find the dif-
-- ferential equations by defining the limit of the ratio:
!
!
i P._(t + dt) - Pi(t),
"; _, dt
which yields,
P'o(t) = - _.Po(t) +//Pl(t) 1P_(t) = _Po(t) -laPl(t) (I)
If we say that at time t = 0 the system was in operation, the _initial conditions are P (0) : I,P_(O) = O. It is also of
u L
interest to consider the case where we begin when the system is
down and under repair. In this case, the initial conditions
_! are Po(O) : O,PI(O) : I.
Transforming E4uations (I) into Laplacc transforms under the
": initial conditions that Po(O) - I,PI(O ) : 0 we have,
P1 'sP (s) - I +AP (s) -/J (s) : O,
'' 0 0
'-i' sPI(s) -APo(S) +/_PI(S) : O, :
k'd
,:', and simplifying,
ii " (s +A)P°(s) "PPI(s) _" 1'
• -_,Po(S) + (s +p)PI(S) = O.
o
Although the 3olutlon for P (J) and Pl(S) can be found easily l
in this case, we shall appl_ Crammer's rule because it will be
useful in later examples. To solve this system of e4uations , we
,i
s_
,I
J
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introduce the determinant D, whose elements are the. coefficients
• : of P.(s)'s. We also introduce the determinant D , ,'hich is
• ]. .... tn
formed by substztutlng the solutlon vector for t_e i coeffL-
ciept column. Then the solution is P.(_) : D./D. Therefore:
: i -H I
I
-: ; 0 s +_i
I
P (s) : ,
,. _ s LX -H
:' . _" -X s +.U
",._ and .
"} s+p i
r (s) : i• 0
' S(S _A+_) '
• _ Now the availability function that snail designate at.@(t) will
be the inverse transform of P (s), that is, A(t) - P (s) t1_1
; Solving o o J,
, _ A(t) - P(t) - _ +[_ ]e + M)t
i ' 'o _+_ kX+_j
.-: " and (2)
' ..'."i 1 - A(t ,: (t) :--- .
: , A+/J
,'. If the system was initially failed, the initial conditions
..,,. are P (0) : O,PI(O) : i, and the solutions are
_, .V 0
"f' : "" r 1
>>' A(t) • e (t) :--"=_ -- #_ " ( _% q- _-_ ) t
.:..,, /l+A
•.:,,!:i...
""",' and (3)
" "/:,.: 1 - A(t) • :_ •
..,.,. L+pJ
t " .i% .
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IWe note that t becomes very large, Equations (2 and (3) be-
come e_uivalent. This indicates that after the system has been
operating for some time, its behavior becomes independent of its
starting state.
The availability function A(t) can be interpreted as the prob-
_ ability that at any time t the system is in an operating state.
In many cases, we are interested in the average uptime for some
definite period. This can be found simply by summing A(t) over
> the time interval of interest and dividing by the total time.
t
i A(T) - I [ A(t)dt . (4)
/
in this instance we have
_ -(_+ _/)T
___fl + _ -2e •
• : A(T) : A+/a OL+ 2T T (5)
If we are interested in the long-term availability of the system
we can let t--_oo and find, ',
(.), ; A(OO) .- . (6)
• ':_ This condition is usually referred to as the steady-state ,
, availability. Essentially, it implies that for a large en-
semble of equipmenL items, the process will maintain itself in
a state of statistical equilibrium.
_.. It is this analytical expression that is commonly used to de-
scribe availabillty in the form:
• 14ean Time Between Failures (FffBF)
;_: Operational Availability • •
(MTBF) + ._ean Time to Repair (MTTR)
i
_._ . This parameter is a measure of an attribute of the system and,
as suchp is subject to two conditions: l
-: 1) The value that is attainable within the resources available;
.' 2) The value that is needed to meet the objectives of the mission.
i
$7
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_. The initial design analysis objective is to establish that the
; attainable probability of system availability meets the mission
needs. The mission requirement depends on the criticality of the -.
mission and risk that is acceptable to management. It may be a
rigorous reHuirement or flexible, i.e.g., the highest probability .
attainable within a given resource allocation. In either case,
\ _ the analytical problem becomes one of optimizing the two opera- ""
tional availability parameters MTBF and MTTR for the operaticaa]
modes of the system.
_ The above analysis is for a single item of equipment with con-
• _ stant repair and failure rates. Several variations of this _
I basic approach to n,ore complex situations are of interest. Forexample, consider the pr blem where the equipment is subjected
to two types of repair. Thus, when the equipment fails for the
: first time, partial repair is performed, which restores the
system to operation. However, this increased the probability
of failure. After the equipment fails for the second time, a
, second repair is performed. Thus, the analytical procedure is _
_ as follows: I __
i) Let_ 1 designate the failure rate when the equipment has
i been £hrough a complete repair;
2) Let _2 designate the failure rate when the e_uipment has
. _ been lhrough a partial repair ( _2 >_I );
3) Let_l be the repair rate for a partial repair;
, 4) Let_2 be the repair rate for a complete repair, i.e., _/2<_I.
Consider the four states of the system as:
...! I) State 0 - System is failed and a partial repair is being
performed;
_:: 2) State I - System is failed and a partial repair is being
performed;
r° 3) State 2 - System £s operating after completion of partial "
_-:" repair;
-v ,
'q 4) State 3 - System is failed and a complete repair is being
": performed.
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The transition matrix becomes:
- (l - Al) At o o
t-
0 (l-_,) l 0
! .. o o (1-A 2) Az
f12 0 0 (I - fi2)
;. : The resulting proportion of time spent in an acceptable state,
i
] A(oo)'P
" + P2 i8 given by:
, A (_) : A.I /21 /22 (7)
AI,_21/1 +A2/22 Pl äÐ X2P24"'_2fll a2 "
Thus, if_(_ : _2' andfll :P2' the above equation reduces to *.. , Zq tlon).
There are several additional interesting variations of the re-
r,ir or maintenance policies that can be considered analytically.
_ %he available function is given for each of these formulations.
' The respective derivations may be found in System Reliability
,' _ Engineering by G. H. Sandler.
4
•_ 1) n equipment with r : n repairment:p .,
i A(oo) : an (8)
.,_ (A+/2)n
"_' 2) Two-equipment item series system with two repairman: ;
•_::: " A(oo) : 3P . (9) '
_ 1 3 # + P4A + 2A 2
".'J 3) n equipment items with l{n repairmen working independently:
H
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'I
!
" n-m-i
A (o0) = _ Pk ' (lOa)
K-O ..
where
, o, {I --"! Pk : ' " Po for k< r (lOB)(n-k) _ k'.
• Pk - " for k__r , (lOt)
• - _ (n-k) ' 1 ", , • - a
•
:, r- n_ 0 + (lOd) _
_: o -- (n-k) .k.Lr ]
(n-k) :k t•
- it
"_ t_ A (lOe)
! . )i 4) Two-equipment item redundant system operating in parallel: .
i ,
; _ +pA2) • ,
_ A (_o) , (#2 (it)
,, lu+xl 2
tl
5) Two-equipment item redundant system operating in parallel
• '_ in which it is not possible to service a failed item of ,
equipment until the complete system fails:
e
2
3 P +pA2 (12)A (oo) :
,.- 3p 2 A 2+ paA +
•
6O
4
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A. DESIGN FOR WEAROUT
The expression of an availability probability in terms of
, .. variables MTBF and MTTR serves the purpose of establishing
system objectives that can be assessed for feasibility and
guidelines for conceptual design.
' "" The total mission time can be compared to MTBF Lo assure
I compatibility. If the mission time in the order of I/I0
' _ of the MTBF, the failure characteristic can be treated as
•" an exponential decay function. If this is not the case,
and the mission time is a larger percentage of the MTBF,
•J then the problem of wearout (useful llfe) enters into the
problem. Wearout is the case where the failure rate starts
" to increase after the steady-state failure performance has
been reached, as in Fig. I.
• , | it
,
• ,
' . _ _WEAROUT REGION
:., _ l
II _t ,
• _ Fie. I -- Wearout Characteristic
r
.f, ,
•.. , J
":_'_i The analytical expression for operational availability
cowmS into use in the concept and definition phases. In :
>:., • the case of _marout, this involves the _ormulatlon of a
_ Y":_, non-Markovlan Process to obtain the steady-state avail-
ed.. ability function. Initlally, nonlinear stochastic equa-
;:'. irons result, whlch, in may cases (but the simplest),B
: prove to be Intractable. floweret, there are many cases in
.J.. whlch the equipment failure distributions are other than
.,__:[ axponentlal, but the transition process can be treated as a
#
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Markov Process by increasing the number of states, each
being described by a constant traasition rate. For example,
consider the single equipment case in which F(t) =
the gamma distribution (see Fig. I). It is assumed that
; the e_uipment goes through two exponential phases, each of '"
, length I_ . Three states are defined:
:, I) State 0 - System is operating in the first phase;
'_ 2) State I - System i6 operating in the second phase; _.
!_ 3) State 2 - System is failed.
" The transition matrix becomes: i,
(l-h)
o (1-/_)
&
The steady-state equations are: _[
-_Po +//P2 : 0
t
; APo "_PI : 0
)_PI"PP2 : o
" _ Po + P1 + P2 : 1
2_A(oo) : 2P :
o 2P+A
This simple example illustrates the technique for solving .
these types of problems in terms of the Markov formula-
lion. In general, the application to a specific situation t
involves the follovin8 steps:
t
I
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1) On the mission level, the equipment performance
characteristics are compared against the mission
profile to provide an hypothetical operational scenario,
"" for the purposes of sizing and to determine critical
equipment usages. The respective snesltivlties in mar-
gins as to the allocation of failure rates and repair
-- rates are assessed to determine overall availability
requirements and equipment compatlbilitles;
2) The identification of a subsequent malntenenac model,
and repair regimen is delineated in accordance with
the projected equipment use profile, and provision for
. wearout is made by the specification of a regimen in
the operational cycle at which wearout results in a
catastrophic failure;
3) The analysis procedure includes the formulation of
either a simulation or, at first, a simple analytical
model to Indicate the appropriate solution to the avail-
• k' ability function. This Implies the estimation of failure
rates, and the knowledge of the state of the system be-
fore wearout;
4) Refin_nv_nt of the availability function to include the
effects of interrupted states may be accomplished by
the specification of successive transition matrices
' and solving for the composite availability function.
i
In terms of the design methodology, and its implications '
I
concerning the systems engineering process, each new state
corresponds to an alternative solution in terms of specify- I
Ing transition probabilities and failure and repair rates.
i The optimal combirmtion of each transition matrix at eachpoint in the design process Involves a multistage decision
-!
process, which can be formulated as a dynamLtc programming
t problem, a great many intuition and empirical
In instances
• experience are substitutes for formml analytical procedures.
Howver, where • large number of cost tradeoffs are in- i L
• volvad, and a great nmmber of transition matrices need be !t
• computed, the automation of the decision process would prove _,,
useful. _ t
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B. SINGLE ELEMENT WEAROUT DESIGN FOR MAINTAINED SYSTEMS
In general._ it has been observed that a large class of
o
,; electronic and mechanical equipment and components ex- ..
hibit failure dlstrLbutlons similar to those shown in
' Fig. 2 (Ref i). This d_str£butlon can be considered most
( conveniently as the sum of three elementary distributions,
_' i.e.,j •f(t) :- aafa(t) + aBfB(t) + ayfy(t) , .,I
where
as, as, and ay , weights for combining the distri-
bution 30 that f(t) will satisfy ._
_, the conditions of a probability
: densILy distribution function. For 4
,;¢ the purpose here, a a _ a_ + a_ - [ _
." }
f_(t) • failure distribution which dominates "
in period _ #
.i
i I ,!
i t I II I t
2' ' ', e ,t II ( .S I
I
" i
I o ;
"t •
!I
----I. _I_,, .----- 2 . ._--- 3 _l .
-I- "
Early Normsl or constant Gaussisn or
failure or ] failure rats period wearout period l
dobusslns ]
period
FiB. 2 -- General Fsilure Distribution for Elece _nlc and
Nechanlcal Equipment and Couponents
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Period 1 is called the early ,i ure or debugging period
where high failure rate items are uncovered and defects
that _scaped quality control Inspecth,n are found. The
number of failures is expected to decrease rapidly with
" time in this periou. A gamma, tribution nk3y be used to
approximate the dist;ibution that dominates in this period.
Figure 3 illustrates the shapes of some conm_n failure dis-
-" trlbutions and related functions.
Period 2 is called the normal failure or constant failure
rate (to be more exact, constant hazard rate) period. It
is the period in which equipment reliability is usually
considered. In this period, the e×ponen,lal law of failuzu
dominates.
Period 3 is called the Gaussian or wearout failure period
where some elements of the equipment fall from wear. The
norm_tl (Gausslan) distribution may be used to approximate
the domlnatln8 dlstrlbuti_n for this period. To the extent
that such a period is known to exist during the useful life
of the e_uipment, it is necessary to estabilsh overhaul and
maintenance policies. It is, therefore, this level or atr.ount
of e_uipment survivability that is the key to providing the
designer with a methodology for achievin$ the re%uired per-
• formance. The _oncept is that there e_ t_ some degree of
. survlvaoillty, p, between 0 a,d l, whirl _ne designer can
• manipulate early in the design cycle to obtain alternative
I and meaningful solutions to the reliability and maintain-
ability problems. ,his degree of survivability _an be
. thought of in two ways:
,
1) It iS a compilation of experience with respect to simi-
• . lar equipamnt in similar operational environments--the
" percentage of failures that have been found to occur
• '" and are reparable'.
, • 2) It is a rough measure of maint.inabil_ty--defined by
, ' spares •v•ilabIllty, level of checkout, and system
_ .: _ repair capability.
_ "'_'i _ Thus, in case of a fail•re, a subryltem can be repaired with
,..... _ a certain probability. Generally, this prubabi'lty will be
' _i i • complex function _f the above mint•inability factors,1• availability of spares, the capabilit) of the repairman, and
i the efficiency of the fault isolation equipment.
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;':' FAILURE RELIABILfTY HAZARD
TYq:. OF DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION _ATE
DISTRIBUTION f(t) R(O z(t) -
. R(I)
V
/ F.xponentlal Xe- _# e" _' X
i 0 6. IIX t 0 0,, 1/_ t 0 t _,• w_aw _t°-l,-"/b .-t'lb _t,-I
o t o t 0 t
" :,,,s - -_L---[" ta - x e-tl6
• : Gllmms (a-l)!b---L--t'_)I"-'lb " e-'lbdr(.-l)IbWJ. "r" ! I" .......
• _ _ jt'l "a-I e-r/bdT
0 # 0 t 0 t
._. ._..-,,-.,,,., _f .-,,-,_,_,,, _.+,,'!,.'
_:-_,-.,'1..',, ,
0 IP # ,, 0 0 t , 0 0 !m J •
_... ,--.-.,-.,_, -_f'+.+.-_,,. _,.+""_' •
"_; _,'+.-_.,-_',_'d,
0 O _ 0 O _ 0 O g
.............. i i
Ft 8. 3 Shapes of Common Failure Distributions/and Related Functions +
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What follows is neither a very formalistic nor a mathe-
matically rigorous approach. Rather, the emphasis is on
how the designer plays his hand through the proper speci-
fication of the survivability factor, p. In this, he is
•' using p as a convenient and useful rule of thumb--a de-
signer's index--which, however, can have a powerful effect
on the design of other elements of the system. The basic
, -- premise is that the reliability of a maintained system is
a function of four parameters,_, _ t, and p. These are
defined as folluws.4
_ t is the desiced operating time for the e_uipment.
._ It is assumed that repairs can be accomplished at
any point within this time--the model ignores the
"_ periods during the mission where repair is impossible.
Examples of such periods are rendezvous operations
' where the crew is fully occupied with the rendezvous
maneuver; midcourse correction where the crew members
are strapped to their seats and are unable to move to
, the areas of the spacecraft where repairs may be neces- L
• sary; and the descent or ascent phases of the mission. _
Usually, these time periods account only for a very
#
small fraction of the total equipment operating time,
and, in this case, no significant error is introduced
by ignoring them.
_is the failure rate, the reciprocal of the mean-time-
between failures, for the system. The widely accepted
• I Weibull failure distribution is assumed here. This means
that it is possible to approximate failures by varying
' ' the distribution parameters during any of the three time
,: periods delineated in Fig. 2.
'[,i:_ _is the repair rate, the reciprocal of the average t_,,_
,;"_.J to restore the system to operating condition. Depending
• "i on the equipment design and maintenance concept, the :
,: • repaiL-time distribtuion may take many forms. It is
,_q • assumed to be exponentially distributed. The reason
,,_,_ for this assumption is that since the mod_t is Insensl-
_'-]. . tire tO the exact form of t,_edistribution (see _e_ I_
<,iiil . a distribution that simplifi..s the mathematics as .-.oc::
as possible will be used, I
li'
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The factcr, p, is the keystone of this approach. It
defines the probability of wearout, i.e., survivability.
In effect, p is equivalent in many respects to some of
the current definitions of maintainability, at least
with respect to a system in an operating environment.
The functional rel_tio._ship of p to the factors pre-
viously given (spares availability, level of checkout,
\ and system repair capability) is a complicated on,, but --
, since the emphasis here is toward the application ,_
, the designer's knowledge, experience,** or the intui-
,5 ti e judgment of p, it is assumed that each of these
• _ factors is probabilistically independent. This is not
entirely accurate. Indeed, much of the work being done
! today in maintainability is directed toward trying to
establish a more formal relationship between, for ex-
ample, test equipment and training, in order to struc-
ture and understand their interaction.
It is clear that if a piece of equipment is repaired and i
i put back into operation, it will have a new failure dis-
• : tribution. If a group of equipment of various ages are , _
kept operating by means of inmlediate repair after any _f
failure, ultimately this mi::ed-age population will appear
to have an exponential failure distribution.
J _
i. MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR A SINGLE ELEMENT MAINTAINED SYSTEM
i Figure 4 illustrates a typical single element maintained
•,_ configuration for which the designer desires to achieve a
i given level of survivability. Theze are many functions
;
ili **If the equipment being designed is similar to other equipment
i.i' already in use, and if the operational environments are compar-
able, p can be obtained from experience, i.e., the percentage of
those failures that have occurr over a period f time that were
found to be repairable. Furthermore, if spares are consumed dur- " ;
ing a mission, p is really a function of time. However, it is
assumed that spares consumption is low, thereby allowing the time
dependence of p to be ignored.
t
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OPERATIVE MAINTAINED :
ELEMENT
r
': Fig. 4 TYPICAL SINGLE ELEMENT MAINTAINED CONFIGURATION
aboard a spacecraft that can be fulfilled by such a system
where a backup is not required. For example, the VHF com-
munication system may very well be without backup, since
being "down" for repairs does not necessarily imply a
catastrophic event. For these systems one is primarily
, interested in availability; i.e., what percentage of the
total mission time the conmQunication system is in operat-
• ing condition. The basic assumption_ for this model are: %
I) During standby operation or while undergoing repair, _9
the failure rate of the element is zero. During op-
eration s the failure distribution is of the Weibull
type, i.e., the probability that a failure occurs
._ between t and t + dt is_dt, where_Y_s the failure
cate.
" 2) The repair distribution is also of lhL hull type,
, : with repair rate_.
" 3) The probability of survival is p (wearout condition).
""': 4) Each failure is repaz_=b!e
_ 5) Failures are detected immediately, and repair actien
-_"_ " starts as soon as the failure is discove.'ed.
!
:..{ At any one time, the system may be in one of three mutually '
exclusive states.
,q ..
"t
t
1 ;
t '
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State 1 - operatingd
State 2 - down and in repair
State 3 - down and nonrepairable ""
Following the usual methods (Ref 2) one can relate the scats:
_'_ probabilities at time "t" with those a short time "dr" later --
• by the e_uations:
_.,_ Pl(t + dt) - el(t ) - _Pl(t)dt + Q P2(t)dt
' _; P2(t + dt) = P_Fl(t)dt + P2(t) -_P2(t)dt (13)
"_. P3(t + dt) = pl(t) (I - p)_dt + PB(t)
These equations can be solved by first obtaining the Laplace
_ transform, where Pl(O) - I, and Pp(o) - P_(o) = 0, and then
'_ finding the inverse. Thus, the differential transition
i matrix is given by:
-_ p_ (l-p)_r]
_'_ -_ 0 (14)
_' o o oi
"_ The probability that the system is operational at time t
_:_ is given by
Ft(t ) _- £-1 S(S.+ ) (15)
i_:i (s+_t) (s+_2)-Sp_, }
P2(t) = _ _ (Q + a) E at .(Q+ b) E bt (16)
a-b
whe re
a : .(_/+_) + {(_/__)2 + 4_/_(I - p) }_
1/2
2
(17)
b = -(,_'+.Q)- {(_..Q)2 + 4,_'.Q(1- p) } 1/2
70 _i
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The availability of the system, or the average time the
" system is operational, during an interval t, is
t
"" A(T) : 11/__ Pl(S)ds 1 (18)
(a-b)t
The percentage availability improvemen_ over a szmilarJ
n_nmaintained (i.e., nonsurvivable) system is defined as
_malntained system/ maintained system /X i00
% availability] -improvemen J availability of nonmaintained system
This function is plotted in Fig. 5 for given parametric
values of_and .Q. The use of this toc1 by the designer
is illustrated in the following section.
q
2. A DESIGN APPLICATION
Consider the designer who is in the prototype design stages
of, say, the VHF communication system of a spacecraft. He
has been told that the availability required of this perticu-
" lar system is 0.928. However, now that he has finished his .
, prototype design, he does a simple and acceptable analysis
by means of a parts count, and finds that his availability
is 0.800. How does he get the 16% improvement to meet the
_, requirement ?
--*.i. There are a few standard approaches he can use. First, he
can reexamine his circuit design with the aid _f a reli- ',
:..... ability expert and perhaps uncover some marginal component
:" ._<*' applications. He can, with the aid of a component parts ,
expert, examtne the parts in the eqt'.;pment and determine
""_ whether he has, in fact, used the highest reliability
< , . components available to him. If, at the conclusion of
,"; this exercise he has improved the availability of the l
:iI
1
lu ,
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system from 0.800 to 0.844, or by about 5.5%, he is still
faced with the problem of achieving an additional 10% im-
provement in availability. What is his next step?
"' If he is guided by pat experience, the designer will
: examine the possibility of incorporating some form of re-
\ _ dundancy into his design. The euuations that will give
"" him additional availability for a given degree of redun-
dancy are fairly straightforward. He applies them and
' _ notes that he can indeed achieve the additional avail-
_ ability in this manner. This, of course, means that he
is not making the entire VHF system redundant but, rather,
he is making redundant only those parts of the system that
he has found to be the least reliable and/or most amenable
to such redundancy. In so doing, however, he has probably
increased the number of Interconnections and al_- the system
weight; and, since this is a space system and weight is ex-
tremely important, he may be in trouble.
• This search for the proper level of redundancy is a valid
• one. In many.cases the use of redundancy will solve his
problem, especially if the system has a relatively short
desired operating time as compared to its mean-time-between-
• failures (_ffBF). However, it is at this point that the de- '
signer, if he has not yet achieved the required design
, availability, frequently shows his lack of apweciation for
the role of maintainability. He will attempt a wholesale
:." circuit redesign in order to achieve his reliability goal,
rather than examine the loglcal next step--enhancing the ,
survivability of the system by making it maintainable.
, Haking a system maintainable is not easy. For one thing
,_ the system design must be such that components or sub-4
:' systems can be removed and replaced and, furthermore, spares; "J'_
: must be made available for replacement. The designer musti determine Just how much and what kind of repair should be
!•:_ included in his system. He must do this in an environment
} of considerable uncertainty, for at this early stage of the ,
_ii" project he does not know the characteristics of the checkout
• or fault-isolation equipment; he does not know what spares
i: '_ " he will be allowed, and he has only a very general appre-
ciation of the maintainance requirements.
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,[ But this air of uncertainty has some advantages for the
designer. It allows him to place additional re_ulrements
, on the system design, because, as the example given below
will show, he can determine just how much improvement in .-
system reliability a given level of survivability will give.
_ For the system shown in Fig. 5, let the MTBF be 500 hr, and ..
assume the desired operating time is 250 hr (about II days).
_ The availability of this system is 0.844. This number is
•{ obtained from:
_. A(T). (I+qlt)e"_t
_uppose the designer's availability goal, arrived at
through apportionment, is 0.928. This implies that avail- i
ability improvement of at least I0% is required. By re- 1
ferring to Fig. 5, we see that for a value of
t = 0.002 x 250 = 0.5, a p factor of approximately 0.6 !
gives an availability improvement of 10%. So a survivability
of 0.6 will yield the desired boost in availabillty-the de-
signer must now find _ys of obtaining the 0.6 p factor. _I
_ Let us assume that the designer concludes that the sysr.em
repair capability is 75%. Then, based on his experie:Lce
with fault-isolatlon systems and knowledge of the fault
isolation task inherent in his design, and from consultations
with designers of £n-fllght test systems, he may reasonably
require the fault isolation system to be 90% effective in
locating the faulty part within his system. Then, there re-
mains the problem of assessing the spares availability that
can be obtained from a certain allowance of spares weight.
Fortunately, there are techniques (Ref 3) for solving this
problem but, for the moment, we will Just apply the rule of
thumb that for electronic e4uipment more than 90% of the
failures are attributable to 10Z of the total number of
parts in the e4uipment. Further, assume that the designer
can, in fact, stock this I0% of the parts and stay within
the weight constraints. He can then consider his spares
availability to be equal tO 90%. Hultlplying these three
factors_ the designer obtains a value
p • 0.75 x 0.90 x 0.90 • 0.6075 l
w
I
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and has achieved the p factor required for the desired de-
: gree of availability improvement.
.. It is at this point that the designer should verify that
this system does indeed meet the availability specificat ons
more efficiently (say at a lower overall system weight) than
_ that of his other alternatives.
/
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APPENDIX C RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY TRADEOFF APPROACH
This example illuqtr_tes an approach to conductlng a Reliability
• (MTBF) and Maintainability (MTTR) tradeoff when given a specified
Inherent Availability. The desired alternative is based on
initial and sustaining costs,
A. Design Problem
A requirement exists to design a radar receiver that will meet an ""
Inherent Availability of 0.990, a minimum MTBF of 200 hours, and
a MTTR not to exceed 4,0 hours. Existing design with the use of .
Military Standard parts meets an Availability of 0.97, a MTBF
cf 150 hours, and a MTTR of 4.64 hours.
B. Possible Solutions _!
Three different alternative design configurations are being considered
, to satisfy availability requirements:
]
' Design Configuration A MTBF* MTTR (hr'*
• ! I. R - deratlng of military 0.990 200 2.02
_ _tandard parts
• _ M - modularlzation and
_ aatomatlc testing
2. R - design includes high 0,990 300 3.03
_eliability parts/components
M - limited modularlzatlon
sad semiautomatlc testing
3. R - design includes partial 0,990 350 3.54
redundancy
M - manual testing and
_imited madularizatlon
Design Configuration l emphasiles the Maintainability aspects in
the design while Design Configuration 3 emphasizes Reliability
improvement. The Reliability-Maintainability relationship is
derived through the eqtmtionl
Inherent Availability (A,) = MTBF
)
--* Conservative 'Estimate - I_wer 2 f Bound
+ Conservative Estimate - Upper 2 f Bound
76
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The area for reliabillty-maintainabillty tradeoff is _ilustrated
in Figure 1.
77
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C. Tradeoff Approach
1) Cost deta are developed aga!nst each configuration. Such
: data include both initlal costs (those associated with design
and manufacture of the equipment) and sustaining costs (those
associated with field operation_ - manpower, test equipment, '-
spare parts, facilities, etc).
2) Initial cost factors are as follows (the values used are
, _ estimated and not necessarily representative of actual
• i experience).
Existing " Configuration Confisuration Configuration
" ,_ Configuration 1 2 3
Item {dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars)
i RDT & E Cost 300,000 324,937 319,125 321,500
kellabillty - 1,187 6,625 16,750
Maintainability - 23,750 12,500 4,750
Manufacture Cost* 4,500,000 4,534,250 4,524,700 4,530, P50 _
W
! Reliability - 1,750 9,200 22,500 ..
_ blaintalnability - 32,500 15,500 7,750
| -
' _ * Manufacture Cost is total based on 300 units.
" I The following tabulation presents the net Incrementnl value (cost)
, "_ of _leliabillty and Maintainability in equi_ent design as derived
from the above figures.
i Contlguratlon Configuration Conf_guratlon
,-..j Item l 2 3
(dollars) (d011ars) (doZlar,_
Rellabillty 2,937 15,825 39,250
MaLntalnabillty 56,250 28,000 12,500
II l 'l I I
'¢,' -#
• 3) Sustainln$ cost factors represent estimated coot to support 300
units for 10 years.
|
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_. Referring to the svstaining cost table, a net sustaining cost
savings is realized for each proposed design configuration.
This saving is derived through the improvement in equipment
availability, resulting in a reduction in required maintenance
support. The followlng computation illustrates the cost savings
. against each design configuration when compared against existing
design:
• Configuration 1 - $966,700
-. Configuration 2 - $997,104
C_nflguratlon 3 - $984,G16
#
' 4) Subsequent to deriving both inltlal and sustaining cost factors,
the net effect is obtained through subtracting the initial
' added costs for Reliability and Maintainability from the overall
sustaining cost savings:
Configuration I $966,700 - $59,187 ffi$907,513
Configuration 2 $997,104 - $43,825 = $953,279
Configuration 3 $984,816 - $51,750 ffi$933,066
Because the sustaining cost factors are estimated values, an
• uncertainty of + 20Z i,,the total costs yields the following
• overall sustaining cost savings: !
+ 207. Configuration 1 $759,444 - $59,187 = $700,257
" Configuration 2 $795,928.80 - $43,825 = $752,103.80 ,
: Configuration 3 $781,182.20 - $51,750 = $729,433.20
- 207. Configuration 1 $1,173,956 - $59,187 = $1,114,769
Configuration 2 $1,198,279.80 - $43,825 = $1,154,454.80Configuration 3 $1,188,448.80- $51,750 ffi$1,136,698.80
l
' D. Design Decision !I
The intent of this tradeoff is to generate and evaluate the
._ alternative Reliability and Maintainability design featuresi
req.ired to meet a specified Availability. In doing so, the
basic evaluation criterion is cost, Referring to the above cost
i , factors, Configuration 2 satisfies the required equipment Avail-
i " ability with maxtnmu _ost savings or minimum initial cost
t ex_.ndtture, even under the conditions of a+ 20Z uncertainty in it
. _he total estimated costs. This lack of sen_ltivity indicates t!
" that the total sustaining cost savings has a broad maximum, overwhich perturbations in such factors as spares, facilities, and "
test equipment have little influence in changing the decision
relative to the ramat_iu8 alternatives. The reason for this is that
l [
i
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Configuration 2, which represents the most cost/effectlve condition,
is a conservative position between the two extremes of too little
reliability (R), and too much modularization (M) and testing. The
combined effect is to produce a cost savings figure of merit based
on the product of M and R that, as one factor is increased, the
other factor decreases in approximately the same proportion. Thus, .-
the essential tvadeoff (for the same amount of availability)
emphasizes a design solution that is a :ompromise and does not
incorporate one overriding critical cost element that would result ..
in a reversal of the sensitivity figures for Configurations i or 3.
)
#
%
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APPENDIX D SOME PROBABILITY BACKGROUND - JOINT PROBABILITIES
In the study of probability theory, it is shown that for two
random continuous variables, x and y, which may or may not be
independent random variables, one can define a Joint probability
•" density function, f (xy). The important property of this function
is that if one takes a random sample from the sample space of xy,
then the probability of finding a value of x that is somewhere in
'\ .. the region F and, at the same time, finding a value of y that is in
, in the same region F is given by //_-)
. Y
x"
where tho integration is made over the region [_
More specifically, the probability of finding x in the region
• xI _ x _ x2 and, at the same time, finding y in the region
Yl S y S Y2 is _2 .Y2
' /  1,JlP xy; xI < x _ x2, Yl _ y _ Y2 = f (xy) d x dy1
..,',_ Furthermore, if x and y are independent r_ndom variables, then the
i Joint probability density function f(xy) is simply the product of .
: the probability density functions for each of the variables
: indivIduaIly.
•"i In 0artlcular, if × and y are assumed to be independent random
-_ i_ variables, the Joint probability density function for_these! variables _.s:
f(xy) = Px (x) py (y)
r . where p (x) is the probability density function for x and py (y)is the Xprobabillty density function for y.
' 83 i
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A. PROBABILITY OF EVENT y> x
Let A be the probabilistie event that the random variable y
. exceeds x. Then the probability for the occurrence of evenl- A
_." is the probability that, in any random sample taken from x and y,
; one will find y >_ x and that x will be found any place at all, ..
\ _" To calculate P{ A} the Joint probability density function
I f(xy) must be integrated over the shaded region /_ of the x, y planebecause that area is the region where y _> x and ,,,here -_ < x _< oo.
%
This gives :
or
x--. y --_O0 PY(Y)'., P {A} .f px,x, dxdy
: '5;i
¢.<_
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B. CA_UIAT ION _EDURE
To evaluate this integral, perfo_ the y integration first. _en,
x will appear in the result when the limits are substituted. _en
perform the x integration. This procedure can be shown in the
• .- following formula. Let
f Y_ _ py(y)\ J_×)= dy
_x
_
. Then x_
P . Px(X) J(x) dx
C. ALTERNATIVE INTEGRAL
Alternatively, we could cover the same shaded region F by another
integrat ion, _y-_oo x-y
P{AI "fy.._ _X, Px(X) PY(Y) dx dY (7) ',-00 °00
Again to e ,aluate this integral, perform the x integration first,
: and y will appear as a parameter in the result. Then perform the,
• y integration. The procedure can be shown by the following. Let .
x=y
L '.," l(y) = Px(X) dx (8)
,I
- , Then
," • P A = I(y) dy (9)
= y-, -oo
,#
!
1
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I). STL_DYOF SOME SPECIAL CASES
• To check the validity of these formulae, we s',alluse them to
P{ A } for some simple cases where the computation i_calculate
not difficult and the results can be checked with intuitive
: expectation. .
I, Ca_e 1 -- Two Nonoverlapping Rectangular Distributions
• a< b< c <d
,,) a b c x or y
J
Con_ider two rectangular dlstrlbution.q as shown above. _.
Px(X) = Py(y) =
_ 0 otherwise 0 otherwise
Using eq (9), we calculate directly that
¢
i ,
I (y) (x) dx = " y-c for c < y < dPx -- -
x-_- so
I for y > d
and
Y-_oo
1}/P A ffi py(y) l(y)dy
y--_-so
I
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But I(y) = 0 for y < c
" and P (y) = 0 for y < bY
and also b < c.I o-
Therefore,p_A_= 0 8q expected,
\,
!
• t
,I
• '* O I t
* la_,
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2. Ca.e 2 -- Two Rectangular Distributions, Cor,_pletelyOverlappin_
i
P (x)
x l-• a<cZd(t
Py(Y) ti, i -.
-_... t a c b
.
/ ¢
"- _ Consider:
"] a gy_ b c _ x< d _'
; Py(y)= P(x)=
: Using Eq (9) we calculate directly _aat-
_ f = ,,.C
l(y) = P (x) dx for c< y<d
_ x
for y > d
, ! X----_--O_
I aud by a straightforward calculation,
"I
t
, Y
.f P (y)I(y, dy m{-_ +'_(-_) I
' "_ --00
.- Xy
,j
' ;- 3. " .ciaI Case -- Idsntlcal Distributions
-'_-J' - t
" Suppose that d=b and c=a. Then the resutt above redaces to.'
88
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4. Special Caqe -- Sy_metrlcally Located Diqtributlon_
Suppose that the two rectangular distributions are sy_metrically
located relatlve to each other. That Is t b-d = c-a. Then the
result for P IA_ in Case 2, again, reduces to
,-
PJA =-_
el
! 5. Case 3 -- Two Rectangular Vlstrlbutlons, Partial Overlapplng
l
) P (x) a,c_b<:d
a c b d
l
Conslder :
I*Px(x) '_ I =Py(Y)
: 0 otherwise 0 otherwlse #
#
Again, using Eq (9)
0 y<c
-. x_y
t • y-c ;
' £(y) = P (x) dx = c<y<d
!
•_ x _-00 'i y>d
I
and oo
: / {• P ^ = Py(y) x(y) = 2 (b.,,a) (d..,c)l
r
1
1
1
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or
kLength of b-a / \Length of d-c
-o
Using the approach described in the preceding section and assuming
a fixed probability over the tolerance interval, we can obtain
expressions for the mean values for the two alternate systems x
o.
and y, and determine the probability that the central "-alueof
x > y. The following figure describes _.hiscase.
',1 x
, I y i
? -
, 8.27 8.78 12.37 13.16
(a) (C) (2; (d)
y=oo x_ y
/ f P(y) P(x) dy!
evaluating × first.
_ ,
Integrating by parts
x < c P(x)=(_c)
c < x < d P(x) =
x > d P(x)= 0
for y
y < a P(y) - 0
a < y < b P(y) =(._-J
t
b< y < d P(y) - 0
%
y > d P(y) = 0
9O
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Now
x=y
,- I(y) = f P(x) dx = _Y'C
J
X'= -00
• " y-+so
11/ "°'P A = _ x _:-i dy
y._ - so
From the evaluation of P(×) and P(y) by parts, the only interval
in which both are real values other than zero, are b to c
y-b
P{A} *=/ _ dY ffi{_ 1 j_
y=C
! Aneyaiuation.__ of this expression using the values in the figure
, p_[A} - 0.35
It is therefore co_cl_ded that because there is only a 35% chance
that System x has a larger ce_ era1 value than System y, we must t
treat them as essentlally ._qua_.
91
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!APPENDIX E LAUNCH-ON-TIME ANALYSES
A. POST DELIVERY REQL_REMENTS
The postdelivery requirements a:e based on t,.o recycles
during prelaunch operations. Therefore, the prob,_bilit_
• of exceeding 2 recycles is considered in the launch-on-
{ ""
time analysis. This includes the followin_ recycle con-
ditions.
l) PN = Probability of the payload surviving, pr¢laupch
operations with N recycles or less.
i
! PN-l : Probability of the payload survi,.,;_n, prelaunch
"_ operations with N - i recycles or le_s (allow
_ one recycle from launch pad). ;
PO .- Probability of no malfunctions in the payl_ad
during prelauncb and marriage tests during any
one cycle (can recur) or recycle.
t 2 N t' _ir
;, 2) PN : PO - PO) PO + (1 - PO ) PO *- . , (1 t'O) O '
po)_ l ,, ,. , l (1 -
i 3) For N : 2, PO : O.95:
PN : 1 (0.05) 3 s 0.999875
PN-1 : 1 (0.05) 2 0.9975
4) Parametric variatlons of P_ are pres,*-nted in Fig. I. ,
The above conditions are u_ed in the fgllowing cal-
culations for launch operations.
B. LAUNCH PAD OPERATIONS - CONFIGURATIC'; 1
22.,1_y Launch Pertod
lO- Day Turnaround
I
With Spare Spacecraft
}
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N = Number ¢_ Recycles
i
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i
•' 1. Payload
Figure 2 presents the timeline showing all possible out-
comes of the payload resulting in two launches within the
3" launch period. Figure 3 presents the corresponding success/ i
._ failure diagram. Let _,
• \ _ P = the probability of achieving a launch on any one ""
attempt (can recur) _"
and
(PLOT) 2 .- the probability of achieving two launches in
the launch period !'
The probability of achieving two launches because of the
payload is the sum of the probabilities of the outcome
shown in Fig. 2 and 3 as follows. 1
Outcome No. Probability of Outcome
i PN2 P2 i__
3 p2 (1 - P)2 PN
3 pN 3 p2 (1 - P)
p2
4 PN3 (I - p)2 PN-I PO
p2
5 PN3 (i - p)2 PN-I PO
p2
E= (PLOT)2=PN 2 { I + 2PN (I - P) + 2PN PN.I PO (i - P)2 1
Let N : 2, PO = 0.95, and P = 0.95.
Then
PN " 0.999875
and See Section A
PN-I -"0.9975
94
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(pLOT) 2 = (0.999875) 2 (0.95) 2 1 + 2(0.999875) (0.05) +
2(0.999875) (0.9975)
(o.gs)(0.0025)
(PLOT)2 = 0.996765
2. _Launch Vehicle_
." • Figures 2 and 3 also apply to the launch vehicle, except
that there £s no l£m£tatlon on the number of recycles
i! I (PN and PN=I do not apply).
Outcome No. Probab£1£ty of Outcome_
p2t
p2 )):2 (1 - P)
• p23 (t - P)
)
_ ii 4 p2 (1 - p)2 PO
-;_._ 5 p2 (1 = p)2 Po '
{ )''i (PLOT)2 = i)2 1.+ 2(I.- P) + 2P0 (I - p)2
.... :'I for P - 0.95) PO - 0.95
; '":I (PLOT)2 : 0.997037
• ,. ,, 3. All Other Ca,uses
"_E', . Let P a probsbility of launching on any one el:tempt (can recur) s
-_ NI = number of attempts required for the first teunch
,_,_ N2 , nmal_r of attempts available for the aecond launch
. ._ (PLOT)2 : probabillty of achieving 2 gaun¢hea £n the launch period
"- j
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.The number of attempts available for the second launch depends
_ on the number of attempts used for the first launch. There-
fore, '.he probability of achieving the second launch in N?
attempts or less depends on the probability of the first launch "-
being achieved in exactly NI attempts.
PN = PN1 PN2
i
" ' _.,_ PNL = P(I - p)N l-1
F
".{
• p)N
?:i PN2 : 1- (I- 2
N2 = NT - N1
where NT : total attempts available. ,I'
The probability of launching two on time is the sum of the i
probabilities of all outcomes
• The calculations are presented in Table 1 for P = 0.90
•._'_.
.'" From Table I
....,, :',. (PLOT) 2 - 0.999540
q
; ,, ..l,. _ "
.
1973003260-102
1973003260-103
• • 4. Results - Configuration #i
22-Day Launch PeLiod
: lO-Day Turnarour_ (launch-to-launch) o.
/
With both Spare Launch Vehicle and 2ayload
\ ,
2
' _ _ Probability of Launch-on-Time
: _ Launch-on-Time Risk {
Payload 0.996765 0.003235
_ Launch Vehicle 0.997037 0.002963
j All Other Causes 0.999540 0.000460 i
t
' ' | Total 0.993353 0.006647
i
I
100
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C. Launch Pad Operations, Configuration 2
30-Day Launch Period
16-Day Turnaround
No Soars Vehicle wlth Spare Payload
i"
I. Payload
Figure 4 presents the tlmellne for all outcomes of the payload
resulting in two launches. Figure 5 presents th_ corresponding
,: success/failure diagram. Calculations are as follows.
i
/
._ Outcome Probability of Outcome
1 p2 p..2
2 p2 pN3 (1 - P)
3 p2 p3 <1- P)
4 4 p2 pN3 PN-1 PO (I- p)2 ,
f
: For PO = 0.95, P = 0.95, PN = 0.999875, PN-I " 0.9975,
(PU)T)2 - 0•994627
• 2. Launch Vehicle
i
Figure 6 presents the timeline and the success/failure diagram
" _or the launch vehicle using Confisuration 2 data• Calculations
are as follows.
101
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, Outcome Probability of Outcome
/
;,"" 2 P2{Po(1-P)}
i
"' { /, • . p2 po(1 p)i (PLOT) 2 I + -
', For P = 0.95 and PO = 0.95,
1 (PLOT) 2 - 0.945369
' 3. All Other Causes
• Table 2 showl the number of launches avsllsble for the second j
; launch as 8 function of the number of attempts used for the first
• launch and presents the calculations. From table 2,
. , (PLOT) 2 = 0.999945
.. i
"'_i 4. Resul.ts, Confisuratlon 2• 30--Day Launch Period
; l_Day Turr_round
No Spare Launch Vehicle with Spare Payload
_ "*' Probability of Launch-on-Time
launch-on-Time glsk
_2".:............::,,
Psylold 0.99462 7 0. 005373 ,
71',,,
• launch Vehicle 0.945369 0.054631
..' All Othor Cause8 0.999965 0.000055
i i ! i i,
" "_1 " TOTAL 0.94038 0.059762
1.05
q
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D. Launch Pad Operations, Configuration 3
30-Day Launch Period
10-Day Turnaround
•" No Spare Launch Vehicle with Spare Payload
I. Payload
e o
Figure 7 presents the tim line for Configuration 3. Figure 8
presents the corresponding success/failure diagram. The
calculations are as follows.
Outcome No. Probability of Outcome
1 p2 pN2
2 p2 pN3(l, p) . ;-
jr
3 p2pN3(pN.l po) (l- p)2
4 p2 pN3<l_ p) q
5 p2 3PN (P_-IPo) (1-p)2
p
• #
6 p2 pN3 (PN-I PO) (I- p)2
• 7 p2 pN3 (PN-1 PO)2 (1 - p)3 "
i
• e pz _3 %-z Po)2 <z- p)a "I
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: _2 p,.2 { (I p)2fPLOT)2 = , 1 + 2 PN (I - P) + 3 P, ( S-I Pc) "# -, .,
:; + 2 PX (P_,-IPO)2 (I- p)3}
For P = 0.95, P_;= 0.999875, PN-I = 0.9975, and PO = 0.95,
, I (_LO_) = 0.999104
"i 2. Launch Vehicle
: Figure 9 presents the timeline for Configuration 3. Figure I0 ',
presents the corresponding success 'failure diagram. Calculations
_ are as follo;:s.
Outcome No. Probability of Outcome
f _+r
I p2 i
"i
, o p2 PO (I - P)
' ! 3 p2 PO (I - P)
4 p2 pO2 (I- p)2
5 p2
PO2 (I - p)2 m
6 pzpo3 (z- p)3
}(PLOT)2 1 + 2PO (I - P) + 2PO2 (I - p)2 + po3 {I - p)3
For P = 0.95 and PO = 0.95,
(PLOT)2 - 0.992407
I!0
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. 3. All Other Causes
-: Table 3 shows the number of launch attempts available for the
: second launch as a function of the number used for the first
launch. From Table 3,
(PLOT)2 = 0.999999
\; .- 4. Results, Current Baseline
_. ; 30-Day Launch Period
10-Day Turnaround
No Spare Launch Vehicle with Spare Payload
!
Probability of Launch-on-Time
Launch-on-Time Risk
Payload 0.999104 0.000896
Launch Vehicle 0.992407 0.007593 _
A11 Other Causes 0.999999 0.0000001
TOTAL 0.991516 0.008484
• , .
J
, p
_. _ •
i,ii"
I
.iii 113 _
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.. APPENDIX F MDNTE CARL0 SIMULATION MDDEL
m_ __ w_mmip_Im wlm_e _ lwmmm _ImWDIB_ el _ _ m
•; DEVELOPMENT OF STORAGE MATRIX
UNTESTABLE TESTABI._
" ." PARTS a PARTS b
1 1 1 BOTH
! GOOD
: 2 1 0 a
•, _ GOOD,
: -_ 3 o I b
{n GOOD
i, J.
'; 4 0 0 NEITHER
' GOOD
R I (UNTESTABLE PARTS) = e
R2 (TESTABLE PARTS) = (__'q'*o
FINISH IN STATE
1
I 2 3 4
J i
*
., RIR2- RLQ_- QIR2- 1 -:E
_-(_b)_'r (-rra{t-_) (.t-__)"ra)
Z i
" t-_
""J. _ 0 0 0 1
,=_ !
"_.... )#= STORAGE FAILURE RATE
= UNTESTABLE PARTS ','.:"_ - TESTABLE PARTS 1
'_ • 'b I
, 1" = TIME OF STORAGE i
C
.__ 11S
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DEVELOPI_NT OF TEST MATRIX
D = PROBABILITY OF NOT CAUSING A
DETECTABLE FAILURE
N = PROBABILITY OF NOT CAUSING AN -.
UNDETECTABLE FAI LUP.E
•, _' P ,, PROBABILITY OF DETECTING A -QDETECTABLE FAILURE
FINISH IN STATE
I 2 3 4
( GOOD DETECTABLE UNDETECTABLE DET. & UNq)ET.
= , . ,, ,
, GOOD DN (I-D) N (I-N) D I- ND '
DNP _(1-r'D) PD(_-N) (1-_' ,_ .rDETECT.
: _ I-N-DP-.PPN
,m,m
z 3
0 0 D I-D
,_ • UNDET.
' {- _ DET. & 0 0 PD l I-PI)
WD_'. i
' _, EXAMPLESOF mTR_X CONSTRUCTION
START IN STATE I, FINISH IN STATE 3, OR
/ __ t_OD AT START, UNDETECTABLE FAILURE AT FINISH
i •
; D I-N
STATE
• . _ t ..... H
"-t - D _,I-N)
rt
__ 116 _)
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START IN STATE 2, FINISH IN STATE 1 OR
DETECTABLE FAILURE AT START, GOOD AT FINISH.
++
STATE 2 P N D
L ''°°+°=° ++I
!
& START IN STATE 2, FINISH IN STATE 2 OR
DETECTABLE FAILURE AT START, DETECTABLE
FAILURE AT FINISH.
N
, , ,-r • STATE
• _ _IDET. FAILURE [ _NDET. FAILURE
i DETECTABLE STATE ,
"! / FAILUREI p_DET.FAILUREI pET.rAIL.
t P N 1-D o
1 = (,-P)N+ _q(1-D)= N(i-m)
.#
/,i[_ i NOTE: SINCE ALL ROW SUMS IN A STOCHASTIC MATRIX .' 1,
THE VALUE OF THE ENTRY IN COLUMN4 OF EACU.ROW
++-_. , , •
IS CALCULATED BY SUBTRACTING THE SUM OF ENTRIES
m
1, 2, aM 3 OF EACH ROWFROM ONE.
s
' %
117
1973003260-121
1973003260-122
BIBLIOGRAI_W
I. Systems Reliabil.i.ty, Systems EnKineerlnSo_and Measures of
Rellabillcy Effectiveness
"Reliability of Military Electronic Equlp_ent," AGREE Report,
' ." U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D.C., June, 1957
"Reliability Monitoring Program for Use in the Design Development,
, ? j- and Production of Air Weapons Systems and Support Systems," U.S.
Air Force Specification Bulletin No. 506, May II, 1959
Cryna, F. M., McAfle, N. J., Ryerson, C. M., and Zwerllns, S.
(editors), Rellsbillty Training Text, IRE-ASQC, March, 1960
i
: Henney, K. (editor), Reliability Factors For Ground Electronic
"" Equipment, McGraw-Ilill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1956
Hall, A. D. A Methodology For Systems Engineering, D. Van. P
' Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N.J., 1962
Goode, H. H. and }4aehol, R. E., System Engineering, McGraw-Hill ._
Book Co., Inc., New York, 7957 #-
Flagle, C. D., Huutns, W. H., and Ray, R. H. (editors), Systems
Engineering and Operations Research, Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, Md., 1960
' Ksrr, H. W. and Geisler, }4. A., "The Design of }4111tary Supply ,
Tables for Space Parts," Operations Re qearch, Vol. 4, 1956 :
i '
Kahn, H. and MAnn I., "Techniques of System Analysls," l_nd
' "_ Corp., Research Memorandum I_1829-1, June, 1957
Sterling, L. J., "Decision Making tn Weapons Development,"
Harvard Business Review, Jan.-Feb., 1958
Hitch, C. J. and }4cKun, R., The Economics of Defense in the
. • , Nuclear Age, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, l_mss., 1960
Novick, D., "System and Total Force Co,t Analysis," Land Corp.,
:"_t • Research He,,o. IU4-2695, April 1967
%
1
119
1973003260-123
Lucy, D. R. and Raiffa, H., Came_ and Decision¢: Introduction
and Critical Surv6y, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1957
Welker, E. L. and Horne, R. C., "Concepts Associated with
System Effectiveness," ARINC Monograph No. 9, ARINC Research
Corp., July, 1960
°.
Reliability Notebook, Rome. Air Development Center, Supplement 2,
t DecemOer 31, 19oi
tK
Myers, R. H., "Mathemati=al and Engineering A_pect_ of Satellite
' .i Redundancy_" Hughes Aircraft Company Report R-60-3, September I,
1960, p. 24
#
t Mace, A. E., "Guide to 5tatistic,d Te_t Design," Guidance
Document Number 2, Voldme ], Battelle Memorial Institute.
•! February 15, 1961, pp. 170-174.
Hald, A., Statistical Tables and Formulas, John Wiley and Son_,
New York, 1958
Mace, A. E., "Guide to Statistical Test Design," Guidance
! Document Number 2, Volume I, Battelle Memorial Institute,
; February 15, )gill, p. A-3
i
' 1I
|
1
• "J
•
.f h • •
120
1
1973003260-124
II. Markov Processes, Probability Theory Optimization of Reliability
Parameters, Availability, and Allocation of Redundancy
Feller, W., An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its
Applications, Vol. I, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
New York, 1957
Parzan, E., Modern Probability Theory and Its Applications,
: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1960
j*
Bharucha-Ried, A. T., Elements of the Theory of Marko_-2
: Processes and Their Applications, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.,
New York, 1953
Doob, J. L., Stochastic Processes, _ohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
New York, 1953
Loeve, M., Probability Theory, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
Princeton, N. J., 1955
Tables of the Binomial Probability Distribution, National
Bureau of Standards, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash.,
D.C., 1949
Cramer, H., Mathematical Methods of Statistics, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1946
Mood, A. M., Introduction to the Theory of Statistics,
, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1950
Dynkin, E. B., Theory of Markov Processes translated from
,_ Russian by Brown, D. D., Prentlce-Hall, Inc , Englewood
Cliffs, N. J., 1961
i Kemeny, J. G. and Snell, J. L., Finite Markov Chains, D.
i Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N. J., 1960
Bellman, R., Introduction to Matrix Analysis, McGraw-Hilt
• Book Co., Inc., New York, 1960
,[
Frazer, W. A., Duncan, N. J., and Collar, _. R., Elementary
Matrices and SomeAppltcations toDynamlcs and Differential ii
I • Equations, Cambridge University Press, London, 1938
Chernoff H. and Moses L. E., Elementary Dec£sion Theory,
John Wiley b Sons, Inc., New York, 1959
121
"|
1973003260-125
Sittler, R. W., "Systems Analyses of Discrete Markov Processes,"
IRE Transactions CT-3, No. 4, Dec., 1956
Weiss, L., Statistical Decision Theory, McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., New York, 1951
°
"A $.. =y of the Current Status of the ReliabilityCahart, R. R.,
Problem," Rand Corp., Research Memo. RM-II31, August 14, 1953
Boodman, D. M., "The Reliability Airborne Radar Equipment,"
Journal of the Operational Research Society of America, Vol. I,
NO. 2, Feb., 1953
Cox, D. R. and Smith, W. L., "On the Superposltlon of Renewal
• " Biometrika, Vol. 41, 1954
. _ Processes,
Billingsley, P., "Statistical Methods in Markov Chains," The
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 32, No. I, March, 1961
I Flehinger, B. _ and Lewis, P.A. "Two-Parameter Lifetime
i
Distributions for Reliability Studies of Renewal Processes,
IBM Journal of Research and Development, Vol. 3, No. i, Jan.,
{ 1959
I Widder, D. V., The Laplace Transformer, Princeton Universl, f Press,
i Princeton, N. J., 1946
Takacs, L., Stochastic Processes, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London,
and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1960
_ Moore, E. F. and Shannon, C. E., "Reliable Circuits Using Less
_. _ Reliable Relays," Journal of the Franklin Institute, Vol. 262,t
Sept., 1956
i Von Newmann, J., "Probabilistic Logics and Synthesis of Reliable
"" Organisms from Unreliable Components," in Annals of Mathematical
_"'J.'._'l Studies, No. 34, Princeton University frees, Princeton, N. J.,
' ' 1956
"-_"_:_"'i":" Birnbaum, Z. W., Esary, D. J., and Saunders, S. C., "Multl-
"_/_-!•4i_" Component Systems and Structures and thelr Rellabillty,"i Technometrics, Vol. 3, No. I, Feb., 1961
._'%_i Cox, D. R., "The Analysis of Non-Markovian Stochastic Processes
•, .. by the Inclusion of upplementary Variables," Proceedings of
'_:] the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 51, Part 3, July, 1955
I,J
t
122
L_ 4 ;,
1973003260-126
Lipp, J. P., "Topology of Switching Elements Versus Reliability,"
IRE Transactions on Reliability and Quality Control, PGRQC-10,
June, 1957
Moskowitz, F., "The Analysis of Redundant Networks," Conxnunieations
; .. and Electronics, No. 39, Nov., 1958
'_ Mine, H., "Reliability of Physical Systems," Transactions of the
1959 Internatlon Symposium on Circuit and Information Theory,h 1"
_ IT-5 Special Supplement, May, 1959i
Lofgren, L., "Automata of High Complexity and Methods for
Increasing Their Reliability by Redundancy," Informatlon and
; Control, Vol. I, No. 2, 1958
!
it Maitra, K. K., "Synthesis of Reliable Automata and Stable Neutral
Nets," Proceedings of the Bionics Symposium, WADD Tech. Report
60-600, Sept., 1960
Flehlnger, B. J. "Reliability Improvement Through Redundancy at
Various System Levels," IBM Journal of Research and Development, i
• i Vol. 2, April, 1958 _m
Balaban, H., "Some Effects of Redundancy on System Reliability,"
_ Sixth National Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control in .
_ Electronics, Wash., D. C., Jan., 1960
' _ Herd, G. R., "Estimation of Reliability Functions," ARINC
Monograph No. 3, ARINC Research Corp., May, 1956
Barlow, R., "Applications of Semi-Markov Processes to Counter
, ) " Stanford '_chnical Report No. 57; and Reliability Problems,
Contact No. N6onr25140, 1960.
Barlow, R. E., and Hunter, L. C., "Reliability Analysis of a
._.j One Unit System," Journal of the Operations Research Society
of America, Vol. 9, No. 2, March-April, 1961
_ Ryswick, R. and Weiss, G., "Tables of the Incomplete Gama
Function of Integral Order," NAVWEPSReport 7292, U.S. Naval
;_" Ordnance Lab., White Oak, Md., Nov., 1960
_* f
..,.. " Ksrlln, S. and McGregor, J., "Coincident Properties of Birth and
Death Processes," Stanford Technical Report No. 9, Contract
:' Nonr-255 (28), 1958
-' ' 123
1973003260-127
_: 5 j
J :l
i i
Kneale, S. G., "Reliability of Parallel Systems with Repair and
Switching," Seventh National Symposium on Reliability and Quality
Control in Electronics, Philadelphia, Pa., Jan., 1961
Derman, C., "Some Asymptotic Distribution Theory for Markov
Chains with a Denumerable Number of States," Biometrlka, Vol. 43,
.°
; 1956
\ Whittle, P., "Some Distributions and Moment Formulae for the
Markov Chain," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, "'
Series B, Vol. 17, 1955
t
Syski, R., Introduction to Congestion Theory in Telephone Systems,
Oliver and Boyd, London, 1960
?
Barlow, R. and Hunter, L., "Mathematical Models for System
! Reliability," The Sylvania Technologist, Vol. Xlll, Nos. 1 and 2,
Jan, and April, 1960
Drenick, R. F., "Mathematical Aspects of the Reliability Problem,"
, |
Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
4
i Vol. 8, 1960
a•
Epstein, B. and Hosford, J., "Reliability of Some Two-Unlt _[
Redundant Systems," Sixth Natlon _" 3ymposlum on Reliability
and Quality Control in ElectronIL_, Wash., D. C., Jan., 1960
Smith, W. L., "Renewal Theory and Its Ramifications," Journal '
of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1958
Cox, D. R. and Smith, W. L., Queues, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London,
, and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1961
! Morse, P. M., "Dynamics of Operational Systems: Markov and
; Queuing Processes," in Ackoff, R.L. (editor), Progress in
'_ Operations Research, Vol. I, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New
York, 1961
Karlin, S. and McGregor, J., "The Differential Equations of
Birth and Death Processes, and the StleltJes Moment Problem,"
Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 85,
1957
Morse, P. M. M., Queues, Inventories and Maintenance, John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., New York, 1958
124
T
1973003260-128
" " Saaty, T. L., "Resume of Useful Formulas in Queuing Theory,"
. Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, Vol. 5,
• No. 2, 1957
' Huggins, N. H., "Representation and Analysis of Signals, Part _:
_. -" Flow-Graph Representation of System Dynamics," Johns Hopkins
_" University Report TN-59-971, Contract AF 19(604)-1941, Nov. 1959
"On,. Weiss, G.H., a Seml-Markovlan Process with a Particular
_' Application to Reliability Theory," NAVORD Report 435, U.S.
Naval Ordnance Laboratory, Nhite Oak s Md., Oct., 1956
:-_ Howard, R., Dynamic Programming and _uarkov Processes, MIT
Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960
Bellman, R., Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press,
. Princeton, N. J., 1957
' Rutenberg, Y. H. s "Sequential Decision Models" Case Institute of
Technology, April, 1961
Kettelle, J., "Least Cost Allocation of Redundancy," Seventeenth t.
National M_eting of the Operations Research Society of America #_
bianne, A. S., "Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions,"
• _ Management Science, Vol. 6, 1960
. _ Dennis s J. E., Mathematical Progranming and Electrical Networks,
John Niley and Sons, 1960
:.! Riley, V., and Cass, S. I., Linear Programming and Associated
'. | Techniques: A comprehensive Bibliography on Linear, Non-Linear '
and Dynamic Programming, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore,
' _ Md. s 1958
VaJda, S. s Mathematical Programming, Addison-Nesley Pub. Co. s
Inc., Reading, Mass., 1961
Bellman, R., Holland s J., and Kalaba, R._ "On the Application of
Dynamic Programmlus to the Synthesis of Logical Systems," Rand
Corp., Paper P-1551, 1958
w
#
Dreyfus s S. I "Dynamic ProgramuinS" in Ackoff, R. (editor),
Progress in Operations Research, Vol. ls John Niley & Sons, Inc.s l
New York, 1961
125
1973003260-129
Crow, E. L., F. A. Davis, and M. W. Maxfleld, Statistics Manual,
Dover Publications, New York, 1960
Dixon, W. J., and F. J. Massey, Jr., Introduction to Statistical
Analysis, _Graw-Hill Book Co., New Yor_, 1951
Frazer, D. A. S., Statistics, An Introduction, John Wiley and
Sons, New York, 1958
\
' i Hoel, P. G., Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, John "'
i Wiley ard _ons, New York, 1952
_ Sprowls, R. C., Elementary Statistics for Students of Social
Science and Business, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1955
,
Shewhart, W. A., Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured
z Product, Van Nostrand Co., Prl.ceton, New Jersey, 1931
Cramer, H., Mathematical Methods of Statistics, Princeton _
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1946 !
Feller, W., An Intro_.ction to Probability Theory and Its
Applications, 2nd Ed., John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957
+
i Sandler, G. H., System Reliability Engineering, Prentlce-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963 I '
i. Reliability Notebook, Rome Air Development Center, Supplement 2,
' i December 31, 1961
:"{ Bazovsky, I., Reliability Theory and Practice, Prentlce-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New 1961
Jersey,
P • ,
i Aroian, L. A., "Maximization of the Reliability of a Complex
._ System by the Use of Items in Sequence," Space Technology
Laboratories Report STL/TM/60-0000-O0034, 1960
Wong, K., "Use of Redundancz,". Hughes Aircraft Company
Reliability Guide, Section 7.0, August 18, 1960
Myers, R. H., "Which Road to Satellite Reliability," Hughes
Aircraft Company Report R-60-2, September I, 1960
Hasford, J., "Measures of Dependability," J. Operations Research
Soc. Amer., January-February 1960
126
I
1973003260-130
i
I
!
Peck, L. G., and Ro N. Hazelwood, Finite Queuing Tables, John
. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1958
Ryerson, C. H., "Rellabillty and Product Assurance" in D. W.
: Chorafas, Statlstlcal Processes and Reliabillty Engineering,
; Van N,_strandCo., Princeton, New Jersey, 1960
t @°
' i
I
I
!
?
!
|
:.i
j
• •t.i
'#;:
2" .' •
127
1973003260-131
ITI. Reliability Models of _intalned and Non-Maintained Systems,
and System Maintenance Policies
Moore, E. F. and Shannon, C. E., "Reliable Circuitq Using Le_s
Reliable Relays," Journal of the Franklin Institute, Vo] '62,
September 1956 .
Von Neumann, J., "ProDabilistic- Logics and Syntheses of Reliable
, Organisms from Unreliable Components," in Annals of MathematJcal
, Studies No. 34, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
' Jersey, 1956
' _i Moskowitz, F. and McLean, J. B., "Some Reliability Aspects of
• \ System Design," IRE Transactions on Reliability and Quality
Control, PGRQC-8, September 1956
%
,"i Bellman, R. and Dreyfus, S., "Dynamic Programming and the
"_ Reliability of Multi-Component Devices," Journal of the Operations
Research Society of America, Vol. 6, No. 2, March-April, 1958 i
4
Sasakl, M., "A Simplified Method of Obtaining Highest System
Reliability," Proceedings of the Eighth National Symposium on
Reliability and Quality Control in Electronics, Wash., D. C.,
January, 1962
Gordon, R., "Optimum Component Redundancy for Maximum System
Reliability," Journal of the Operations Research Society of
i America, Vol. 5, No. 2, April, 1957
i% Flehlnger, B. J., "Reliability Improvement Through Redundancy at
" Various System Levels," IRE National Convention Record, Part 6,
._ March, 1958
' Barlow, R. E. and Hunter, L. C., "Mathematical Models For System
Reliability," The Sylvania Technologist, Vol. XIII, Nos. I and 2,
January and April 1960
Y'_ Hall, K. M. and McDonald, R. H., "Improving System Reliability,"
Proceedings of the Seventh National Symposl.um on Reliability and
"_.... Quality Control in Electronics, Philadelphia, Pa., January, 1961
.>: Kamins, M., "Determining Checkout Intervals for Systems Subject
.....,. to Random Failures," Rand Corp. Research Memz>randum, RM-2578,
;': i June 1960
128
I
1973003260-132
Firstman, S. I. and Voosen, B. J., "Nissle Pre-launch Confidence
Checkout: Content and Equipment Design Criteria," Rand Corp.
Research Memorandum, RM-2485, February, 1960
Morse, P. M. M., Queues, Inventories and Maintenance, John
.. Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1958
Barlow, R. and Hunter L., "Optimum Preventive _aintenance
_ Policies," Journal of the Operations Research Society of
America, Vol. 8, 1960
,'| Welker, E. L. and Bradley, C. E., "The Dollar Value of Improved
! Reliability," Proceedings of the Seventh National Symposium on
! Reliability and Quality Control in Electronics, Philadelphia,
"_ Pa., January, 1961
i Brander, D. M., "The Statistical Dyl_amics of Preventive Replace-
ments," Convention Record, WESCON, August, 1958
Barlow, R. E. and Proschan, F., "Planned Replacement," Di-82-0102, ,
I Boeing Scientific Research Laboratories, April, 1961
Truelove, A. J., "Strategic Reliability and Preventive Maintenance," _f
, Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, Vol. 9,
: No. 1, January-February, 1961
Hail, K. M., "System Maintainability," Proceedings of the Eighth
. _ National Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control in
Electronics, Wash., D. C., January, 1962
'/.] "Reliability Stress. Analysis for Electronic Equipment,"
' "i Technical Report TR-59-416-1, R.C.A., Camden, New Jersey,
6
January, 1959
t Earlas, D. R., "Reliability Application and Analysis Guide,"
i._.i_... The Martin Company, D_nver, Colorado, September 1960
"Handbook for the Prediction of Shipboard and Shore Electronic
"_::'_ " Equt[msnt Raliabtltt_', T!_133, _L_VSHIP 93820, Vitro Laboratories,
" April 1961
"!:I " Bazovsky, I., Reliability: Thaory and Practice, Prentice-Hall,
'_'",__ " Ino,, Znslewood Cliffs, New Jarsay, 1961
',, .q
", Loyd. D. K. and Llpow, M., Reliability: Msna_ent, _thods, and
: Mathe_atics, Prantiee-_hall, Inc., E_lawe_d Cliffs, N. J., 1961
129
r,':
1973003260-133
IV. Milltary Re.liabi!.Ity and Availabillty, . _ Requirements
"Reliability of Military Elec :renic E1uipment," Report by
Advisory Group on Reliabilit_ of Electronic Equip_e=t, Office.
of the Assistant Secrets.'y of _efense (Research and Engineering)
June 4, 1957 ..
Connor, J. A., "Compo :nt Application Stress Analysis,:'
• Proceedings, Electronics Co_ponents Conference, 1958 -.
Ryerson, C. M., "RCA Reliability Program and Long Range
" Objectives," RCA, Camden, New Jersey, March 15, 1955
A
Bryson, H. C., "The Training Aspects of Design Reviews,"
Proceedings Fourth National Symposium on Reliability and
_, Quality Control, January 6-8, 1958
RADC Reliability Notebook, Section 8, Rome Air Develol_ent
Conmmnd, December 31, 1961
Mil Handbook 217 (TJEPS), December 31, 1961. APINC Research
Corporation, Publication No. I01-17-145, p. 16 _'
H. Smith et al, "A Prediction of AN/GRC-27 Reliability," Rome #f
Air Development Center Report TN=58-18, August 26, 1957f
• Military Standard 756 (WEPS), "Reliability of Wespons Systems, ,
Procedures for Prediction and Reporting Prediction of,"
',_ October 3, 1961
t
:_ Myers, R. H., "Mathematical and Engineering Aspects of Satellite
Redundancy," Hughes Aircraft Company Report R-60-3, September 1, .
! 1960
Jerencslk, A. P. and W. T. Sackett, Jr., "The Step-Stress Method
_...i'| of Obtaining Short-Term Life Ratings on Electronic Components,"
• ._ Preceedings, National Electronics Conference, Vol. 8, 1952
Reeves, T. C., "A Reliability Approach to Thermal Design and ,
Evaluation," Electrical Manufacturing, February, 1957
Taylor, N. H., "Designing for Reliability," PToceeding IRE,
June, 1957
Connor, J. A., "Prediction of Reliability," Proceedings, Sixth
National Sylposium on Reliability and Quality Control, January, 1960
130
1973003260-134
*j
i
Department of Defense Technical Report, TR-3, "Sampling
Procedures and TabLes for Life and Reliability Testing Based
on the Welbu11 Distzlbutlon," _ashlngtou, D° C., September I0,
1961.
._ Davldson, K. N., and E. E..Tohnsonp "Rellabillty Evaluation
by Applicat._.onDeratlng," Proceedings of the National
Symposium on Rellability and Quallty Control, January, 1962,
i _. p. 215.
Horrison, H. E., and O. N. Nood, "Application of Linear
Discrlmlrant Analysis as a Screening Technique," Hughes
I Aircraft Company, Unpublished Report
Thomas, R. E., A. R. Fiqh, H. H. Braner, and N. E. Chapln,
: _cvelopment of a Methodology for Screening Electronic Parts
by Using Linear Diserlmlnants," Battelle Memorial Institute
Electronic Component Reliability Center
Enqulst, R. D., R. 8. Feuchtbaum, F. Z. Ke_ster, "The Folklore
of EncapsJlatlon,"Insulation Magazine, May 1961, Lake Publishing
, Corp., LibertFville, Illinois
Myers, _. H., "Which Road to Satelllte Rellabiltty," Hughes
Airccaft Company Report R-60-2, September I, 1960, p. 12
Raytheon Company Industrial Components Divlsicn Report,
! "Rellabillty Assurance Prosram," Figure I, p. 19
!
! D#.nlels, _. N., "Micro-Bearlng Abstract," New Hempshlr, _. Ball
Bearings. Inc., Teterboro, New Hampsb,re, September, 1958
t
EyaCc Relier Bearings, Catalog 150, Hyatt Bearings Division, O
General Hotore Corporation, Harrison, New Jersey
Luebbert, Captain W. F., "Literature Guide on Failure _ontrol
and P.eliabllity, '_ SCan£ord Electronic Laboratories, December,
• 1956 '_
"Re? "ability of _illtery _lectronlc _quilmmnt," AGREEReport, t' '
Wv..stngton, D. C., U..q. Government Printing O_fice, 3une, _l
". 1_57
i P-xhiblt 60-11A. AFIP/, General RelJAblltty _peciflcatlon forW$107A-2, Titan 2o Octob r ._0, 1960
t *131
1973003260-135
Handbook H-I08 (DOD), "Sampling Procedures and Tables for Life
and Reliability Testing," April 29, 1960
: MIL-STD-441, "Pellabillty of Military Electronic Equipment,"
June 20, 1958
Specification Bulletin 506 (USAF), "Reliability Monitoring '.
Program for Use in the Design, Development, and Production
: of Air Weapons Systems and Support Systems," May II, 1959
QI
MIL-STD-756, "Procedures for Prediction and Reporting Prediction
i of Reliability of Weapon Systems," October 3, 1961
i MIL-R-19610 (AER), "Reliability of Production Electronic
Equipment, General Specification for," September 15, 19_6
MIL-R-22256 (AER), "Reliability Requirements for Design of
" November 5, 1959Electronic Equipment or Systems, i
MIL-R-22732 (Ships), "Reliability Requirements for Shipboard !
and Ground Electronic Equlfment," March lO, 1961
MIL-R-26474 (USAF), "Rellab1.11ty Requirements for Production
Ground Electronic Equipment," June 10, 1959 }_
MIL-R-26484 (USAF), "Reliability Requirements for Development
of Electronic Subsystems or Equipment," June 2, 1958
MIL-R-26667A (UCAF), "Reliability and Longevity Requirements,
} Electronic Equlp_.nt, General Specification for," June 2, 1959
i
i M_L-R-27070 (USAF), "Reliability Requirements for Development
'_ of Ground Electronic Equipment," March 25, 1960
_IL=R-27173 (USAF), "Reliability Requirements for Electronic I
Ground Checkout Equipment," July 6, 1959
MZL-R-27542 (USAF), "Reliability Program Requirements for
Aerospace Systems, Subsystems, and Equipments," June 28, 1961 •
NPC250-I (NASA), "Reliability Program Provisions for Space
System Contractors," May 13, 1963
t
i
132
1973003260-136
' Sylvania, DesIKn Review Manual, Electronic Systems Division,
': Mountain View, California. Note: The bulk of the material
_" In this manual was developed st Sylvania by R. S. CazanJlan
_ wlth the invaluable support of David Ehrenprels, Consult,_.ng
} Engineer, who provided much of the original thought and effort.
, /
_IL-STD-439B, "The Electronic Circuits," May 15, 1961,
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Prlntln_ OFfice,
Washlngtou 25, D. C.
- NAVWEPS16-I-519, "Handbook of Preferred Circuits, Navy
' ': _ Aeronautical Electronic Equipment," National Bureau of Standards,
• _ Department of Commerce for Bureau of Na_Teps, Department of the
. _ Navyp September I, 1955, Supplements 1, 2 and 3
Hurley, R., Junction Transistor Electronics, John Wiley and
_.., Sons, New York, 1958
MacDonald, F. It., "Component-Board Vibration Nomograph,"
i Electronics Equipment Engineering, Vol. 6, No, 5 (May 195_),p. 58
• Timoshenko, R., Strength of Materials, 3rd ed., Van Nostrand,
New York, 1955
' " March,• _ NIL-Handbook-5, "Strength of l_tsl, Aircraft Elements,
1959, Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing
' : Office, Weshlnston 25, D. C.
• Nlvy Reliability Do|ll;n Hondb6ok, U. S. HarT, Bureau of Ships,
Washinston 25, D. C., July 15, 1961• v - I
Toark, R. J,, Formulas for Stress and Strain. 3rd ed., HcGraw-
"; Hill, Nw York, 1954
•;, " HIL-I-6181D. "Interference Control Requirements, Aircraft
Equipment, Noveuber 25, 1959) U. S. Government Printing Office
,."..,_, _ , Reliability Notebook, RomeAir Development Center, Supplement 2.
4, Docembor 31, 1961, Seetiou 7
, ._2',_,. • MIL-_-27_' (USAF), Relisbility Prosrem Requirmnts for
. _.,_; Aerospace Systems, Subsystems and Equipments, June 28, 1961
|_ m_-sl_-105c, snpltu_ hN_t_re..,d _abl,_. for InspoctLo.
•_ ._ "_ by Attributes. July 18. 1961
133 ,
1973003260-137
MIL-STD-414, Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by
Variables for Percent Defective, July II, 1957
Herd, G. R. et al, "Electronics Reliability," ARINC Monograph
No. 2, May 25, 1955, pp. 36-37
Doob, J. L., "Renewal Theory from the Point of View of the Theory
c Probability," Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., Vol. 23, 1948
" U. SEpstein, B., "Statistical Techniques In Life Testing, .
Department of Commerce, Of flee of Technical Servl_es Report
' _ PB 171580, pp. 1-102
"Reliability Training Text," Institute of Radio Engineers,
2nd Ed., March. 1960, p. 147
"Air Force Reliability Assurance Program Progress Report No. ] "
: Aeronautical Radio, Inc., February 15, 1956 i
_ Mollna, E. C., Polsson's Exponential Binomial Limit Tables, D. _
Van Nostrand Company, New York, 1942 i
Brownlee, K. A., Industrial Experlmentatlor, Chemical Publishing _ _
Company, Inc., New York, 1949, p. 47 j-
: Brownlee, K. A., Industrial Experimentation, ,nemlcal Publishing
t_
Company, Inc., New Yorz, 1949, p. 40
'i Department of Defenqe Technical Report, TR-3 "Sampling Procedures
Lnd Table_ for Life and Reliability Teqting Ba_ed on the Wei_ull
_ DL_trtbutfon," '¢a_hington, D. C., September 30, 1961!
'. _ Department of Defenqe Handbc-ok H108, "Sampling Procedure_ and
" Table._ for Life and Reliability Te_tln8," Washington, D C
April 29, 1960
Epstein, B., "Statlstlcal Techniques in Life Testlng," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
1_ 171580. _. 2.3 ,
Epstein, B., "Statistical Tech_lqun in Life Testing " U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Techu!©el Services Report
1_ 171580, p. 2.17
t
Epstein, B., "Statlsti=_l Techniques in Life Testing," U. S,
Dept. of Comuerce, Office ot Technical Services Report
PB 171580, pp. 2.16 and 2.17
134
1973003260-138
, t
U. S. National Bureau of Standards, "Tables of the Binomial
Probability Distribution," U. S. Government Printing Office,
• Washington, D. C., 1949
- Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
_ - Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB 171580, pp. 2.24- 2.26
\ _ / Burington, R. S., Handbook of l_tthematical Tables and Formulas,
2nd Ed., Handbook Publishers, Inc., Sandusky, Ohio, 1940
• _ Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
i PB 171580, pp. 2.1 - 2.3
{ Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB ]71580, pp. 2.13 and 2.14
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
• FB 171580, pp. 2.17 - 2.19 _jt
Document Number 2, Vol. 1, Battelle Me_rial Institute,
February 15, 1961, pp. 191- 194
• ! "ASTH Manual on Quality Control of Materials," American Society
for Testing Haterials, 1951, p. 28
Ashby, R. H., "A Research and Development View of High
• ! Rellability," Transactions of the 1961 Reliability Symposium, ,
Los Angeles, California, Sponsored by the American Society
for Quality Control
_ Shwop, J. E., and H. J. Sullivan, _dttors, Semiconductor
_'_'"'i_ Reliability, Engineering Publishers, Elizabeth, New Jersey,
-, ! 1961, p, 20
• Handbook of Methods of Cooling Air Force Ground Electronic
Equipment, Coruell Aeronautical-Laboratories, RADC-TR-58-128,
.... ASTIA AD-148907, 1958
CezanJian, R. S , "A Unique Approach to Reliability Design
._ Reviews," 6th Joint Military-Industry Guided Missile
.: Reliability Symposium, Vol. 1 (February 1960)t pp. 1-94
155
b
]973003260-]39
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB 171580, pp. 2.54- 2.69
: Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB 171580, pp. 2.24- 2.27
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report ""
, PB 171580, pp. 2.15 - 2.17
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
,_. PB 171580, p. 2.26
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in life Testing," U. S
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB 171580, p. 2.3
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB 171580, p. 2.17
Epstein, B., "Statistical Techniques in Life Testing," U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services Report
PB 171580, pp. 2.26 - 2.27 i
Myers, R. H., "Reliability Testing Sampling Procedures and
Tables Based on Acceptable Reliability Levels," Hughes
Aircraft Company Report R-56-bA, October I0, 1956
MIL-R-26667A (USAF), Re_labillty and Longevity Requirements
Electronic Equipment, General Specification, June 2, 1959 I
Department of Defense, "Reliability of Military Electronic
Equipment" (AGREE Report), U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., June, 1958
Golde" , P. J., "How RCA Meets AGREE Test Requirements,"
Proceedings 15th American Society for Quality Control
Convention, Philadelphia, Pa., June 5-7, 1961, p. 204 • ii
,/
ij:
136
]973003260-]40
!
b
' Holohan, J., "Quantitative Approach Gets Reliability Results,"
Space/Aeronautics, April 1961, p. 125
AMCP 74-IA, Reliability Evaluation Procedures for Pilot
Production and Production, February 1, I961
L,
'if '
I
t
q
'tl
e
i
137
1973003260-141
V. Rella_tity Practices, Reliability Production and Testing
,: Department of Defense, Military Specification MIL-STD-210A,
"Climatic Extremes for Military Equipment," August 2, 1957
Fletcher, R. D., "A Relation between Maximum Observed Point
and Areal Rainfall Values," Transactions, American Geo-
• physical Union, Vol. 31, pp. 3&4-348, June 1950
\__ U.S. Air Force Specification Bulletin No. 523, "Space
i Environmental Criteria for Aerospace Vehicles," November 28,
'. 1960
• _ Tong, K. N., Theory of Mechanical Vibrations, John Wiley and
i 'Sons, 1960Thomson, W. T. Mechanical Vibrations, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall,,,. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1953
• Den Hartog, J. P., Mechanical Vibrations, 4th ed., M_Graw-Hill,
New York, 1956
i Office of Secretary of Defense, Bulletins of Symposium onShock, Vibration and Associated Environments, Bulletins :_ .
February 24, 1957; December 25, 1957; June 27, 1958; August 28,
_ 1960; June 29, 1961
,! Crandall, S. H. (editor), Random Vibration, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, The Technology Press, 1958
i Harris, C. M., and C. E. Crede, Shock and Vibration Handbook,, Vols. I, 2 and 3, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961
Lehr, S. N., V. J. Tronolone, and P. V. Horton, "Equipment
Design Considerations for Space Environment," Space Technology
Laboratories Technical Report STL/TR-60-0000-09224,
September, 1960
Mtnzer, R. A., and W. S. Rtpley, "The ARDC Model Atmosphere,
1956," Air Force Cambridge Research Center, ARDC, December,
1956
Minzer, R. A., K. S. W., Championp and H. Lo Pond, "The ARDC
Model Atmosphere, 1959," Air Force Cambrldge Research Center,
ARDC, August 1959
138
1973003260-142
Brueschke, E. E., "The Effects of the Space Environment on
Electronic Components and _terlals, Parts I and If," Hughes
Aircraft Company Special Research Study, SRS-369, June 15, 1960
Yarwood, J., High Vacuum Technique, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd ed.,
revised 1955
Scott, R. B., Cryogenic Engineering, Van Nostrand, Princeton,
e New Jersey, 1959
Valley, G. E., Jr., and H. Wallman, "Vacuum Tube Amplifiers,"
Vol. 18, M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory Series, _raw-Hill,
New York, 1948
U. S. Air Force S.Qeciflcatlon MIL=E-5272C, "General Specification
for Environmental Test, Aeronautical and Assolcated Equipment,"
1959
U. S. Department of Commerce, "Statlstlcal Abstract of the U. S.," |
Annual Editions
!
Greathouse, G. A., and C. J. Weasel. Deterioration of _tsterLals, _fRelnhold, New York, 1954
Sissenwtne, N. and A. Court, "Climatic Extremes for Military
Equipment," Report No. 146 OQl_, Department of Army, November, 1951
Riley, F. C., and P. F. Walker, and F. W. Schwartz, "General
Bibliography and Index of Environmental Criteria for Aircraft
and Airborne Equipment" (unclassified tltle), WADC Technical
Report, June 1955
Editorial Report, "Envlron_mnt," Ground Support Engineering, s
April/May 1961, p. 32
Frederic, M., and E. Fornarlo, "Correlation of Temperature-
Humidity Tests," WADC Technical Report 53-107, Part 6 Summary
, Report, Oecember 1953
I,
Carrier Corporation, "Psychrometrlc Chart, Normal Temperatures, i
Copyrisht 1946 _ 14
!|
p-
139
1973003260-143
Frederick Research Corporation, Bethesda, Maryland, Contract
AF 33(038 'n,.3341, "Design Techniques for Interference-Free
Operation of Airborne Electronic Equipment," WADC Technical
Report, 1952
_UL-STD-&41, "Reliability of Military Electronic Equipment,"
: June 20, 1958
i MIL-R-27542 (USAF), "Reliability Program Requlrement_ for
\_: Aerospace Systems, Subsystems, and Equipments," June 28, 196]
; MIL-R-22256 (_ER), "Reliability Requirements for Design of
'-_ Electronic Equipment or Systems," November 20, 1959
MIL-R-22732 (SHIPS), "Reliability Requirements for Shipboard
: and Ground Electronic Equipment," March I0, 1961
MIL-R-26474 (USAF), "Reliability Requirements for Production
Ground Electronic Equipment," June I0, 1959
MIL-R-26484 (USAF), "Reliability Requirements for Development
" of Electronic 3ubsystems or Equipment," April 18, 1960
%
MIL-R-26667A, "Reliability and Longevity Requirements, _[
Electronic Equipment, General Speclflcatlon For, June 2,
1959
_t
MIL-R-27173 (USAF), "Reliability Requirements for Electronic
Ground Checkout EquiFment," July 6, 1959
_, Air Force Manual 66-1, "Maintenance Management," July I, 1961
, i
Hughes Aircraft Company Report R-60-4, "Department of Defense
i Deficiency and Failure Reporting Code Review Panel Final Report,"
October 15, 1960
Ryerson, C. M., "Reliability Testing Theory Based on the
Poisson Distribution," Proceedings 4th National Symposium
Reliability and Quality Control, Washington, D. C., January
6-8, 1958
Molina, E. C., Poisson's Expenentlal Binomial Limit Tables,
Van Nostrand, Prln-eton, New Jersey, 1942
%
RETMA Report, "A General Guide for Technical Reporting of
E1ectronlc S/stems Rellabillty Measurements," December, 1956
140
NA_ f,--MBII'C
1973003260-144
